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Online learning is the process of learning to make accurate predictions and
optimize actions sequentially in each period based on the information gained
through the previous decisions and observations. In many real-world prob-
lems, the underlying model is unknown and possibly stochastic. Therefore, it
is not possible to optimize actions using analytical methods. The goal of online
learning is to learn from past observations as quickly as possible to minimize
the loss that results from not knowing the true underlying model. Since uncer-
tainty plays a big role in power system operations and power consumption, it
makes optimizing actions a very challenging task for participants of wholesale
electricity markets. This results in various interesting problems that requires an
online learning approach. Motivated by two different applications in electricity
markets, we study two different online learning problems.
We first study the problem of online learning and optimization of unknown
Markov jump affine models which is motivated by the dynamic pricing problem
of an electricity retailer. An online learning policy, referred to as Markovian
simultaneous perturbations stochastic approximation (MSPSA), is proposed for
two different optimization objectives: (i) the quadratic cost minimization of the
regulation problem and (ii) the revenue (profit) maximization problem. It is
shown that MSPSA is an order optimal learning policy in terms of regret growth
rate. More specifically, the regret of MSPSA grows at the order of the square root
of the learning horizon, and the regret of any policy grows no slower than that
of MSPSA. Furthermore, it is also shown that the MSPSA policy converges to
the optimal control input almost surely as well as in the mean square sense.
Simulation results are presented to illustrate the regret growth rate of MSPSA
and to show that MSPSA can offer significant gain over the greedy certainty
equivalent approach.
Motivated by virtual trading in two-settlement wholesale electricity mar-
kets, the second problem we consider is the online learning problem of optimal
bidding strategy in repeated multi-commodity auctions. A polynomial-time on-
line learning algorithm is proposed to maximize the cumulative payoff over a
finite horizon by allocating the bidder’s budget among his bids for K options
in each period. The proposed algorithm, referred to as dynamic programming
on discrete set (DPDS), achieves a regret order of O(
√
T log T ). By showing that
the regret is lower bounded by Ω(
√
T ) for any strategy, we conclude that DPDS
is order optimal up to a
√
log T term. Our result also implies that the expected
payoff of DPDS converges, with an almost optimal convergence rate, to the ex-
pected payoff of the global optimal corresponding to the case when the un-
derlying model is known. By using both cumulative payoff and Sharpe ratio
as performance metrics, evaluations were performed based on historical data
spanning ten year period of NYISO and PJM energy markets. It was shown
that the proposed strategy outperforms standard benchmarks and the S&P 500
index over the same period.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Online learning has been studied in various fields such as statistics, com-
puter science, operations research, and economics in different contexts such
as clinical trials, online advertisement auctions, dynamic pricing, and repeated
games. In this chapter, we first provide a general overview of online learning.
Then, we will talk about the two different online learning problems studied in
this thesis. For each problem, we pesent its motivating application in electricity
markets, literature review of related work, and our contributions.
1.1 Overview of Online Learning
Online learning is the process of learning to make accurate predictions and/or
optimize actions sequentially in each period based on the previous decisions
and observations. The complete knowledge of the true underlying model is not
available to the learner as in all machine learning problems. The goal is to adapt
and improve predictions about the true underlying model each period based on
the observations and additional information that becomes available that period.
In the simplest form of the online learning problem, there are finite num-
ber of actions to choose from for the learner. Depending on how the rewards
that are associated with the available actions are generated, an online learning
problem belongs either to the stochastic setting or to the nonstochastic (adver-
sarial) setting. In the stochastic setting, the reward of each action is drawn from
a fixed but unknown distribution at each period; whereas, in the nonstochastic
setting, the reward associated with each action is assumed to be generated by
1
an opponent (adversary) at each period.
Online learning problems can be divided into three categories based on the
information that becomes available to the learner each period. If the learner
can observe the reward (or loss) associated with every action in each period
regardless of the learner’s own action, then the problem is called experts (or
full-feedback) problem [24, 25, 34, 46]. Otherwise, it is called partial-feedback
problem [25, see Chapter 6]. If the learner’s observation is restricted only to
the reward of the action taken by the learner at each period, then the problem
is referred to as a multi-armed bandit problem [6, 55] which is a special case
of partial-feedback (partial-information) setting. (See [23] for a comprehensive
survey on multi-armed bandit problems.)
The fundamental difficulty in a multi-armed bandit problem (and also in
most partial-feedback settings) is the exploration and exploitation tradeoff.
Since the learner’s goal is to optimize the total payoff over a finite or infinite
horizon, the myopic approach of trying to maximize only the current period’s
reward fails to be optimal. The learner needs to establish a balance between
exploiting what is learned so far by choosing the best action based on previous
observations and exploring the outcome of other actions that are not explored
enough to see if there is a better action that will lead to higher rewards in the
future periods.
If the action (decision) space is a continuous set rather than a finite set, then
some assumptions on the relationship between the rewards of all actions are es-
sential. Otherwise, the learning problem becomes an impossible task due to the
infeasibility of exploring the reward of each action (or even calculating the re-
ward of each action in the case of experts problem). In general, this relationship
2
is established by expressing the reward of an action xt at period t as a function
of that action, i.e., rt(xt).
In the literature, the setting of continuous action space with concave (ex-
pected) reward function is studied extensively, and efficient convex optimiza-
tion methods are adapted to obtain online learning algorithms with good per-
formance guarantees such as stochastic (online) gradient descent [73, 84] and
stochastic approximation methods [43, 70, 74]. In the case of non-concave but
smooth reward functions, the decision space is explored by using various dis-
cretization approaches [1, 45, 47] due to the necessity of a global search strategy.
However, for the experts problem, this approach may lead to computationaly
expensive algorithms that are impractical in practice in the case of high dimen-
sional action spaces.
An online learning algorithm (policy) µ is defined as a sequence of decision
rules µ1, µ2, µ3... such that at period t, µt maps the information history It contain-
ing all past observations, decisions, and any other information available to the
learner at period t to the next action xt+1 that needs to be taken by the learner.
The performance of an online learning algorithm is generally measured by
its regret. For the stochastic setting, regret of a policy µ is defined as the differ-
ence between the cumulative expected reward of the policy µ and that of the
optimal solution under known model∗. For example, for online learning prob-
lems with finite optimization horizon T , the regret is expressed as
RµT = sup
x
E
(
T∑
t=1
rt(x)−
T∑
t=1
rt(x
µ
t )
)
,
where xµt denotes the action chosen by policy µ for period t. The expectation
∗The regret defined here is also referred to as pseudo-regret in some literature to reserve the
term ”regret” for a different definition, e.g., [23].
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is taken with respect to the randomness in the reward and also in the policy µ.
For the adversarial setting, the same regret expression is used. However, in that
case, the expectation is taken with respect to the randomness in the policy µ and
in the opponent’s strategy.
In the stochastic setting, since the reward distribution for a given action is
fixed over time, the incremental regret is non-negative at each period. There-
fore, the regret grows monotonically with T for any policy. For a simple fixed
strategy that chooses the same action at each period, the regret grows linear in
T . Hence, the goal is to obtain online learning policies that has a sublinear and
optimally the slowest possible regret growth rate in terms of T .
To show that the regret growth rate is optimal in terms of T for an online
learning policy µ, one needs to obtain an upper bound for regret of policy µ
and a lower bound for regret that holds for any online learning policy and
matches the regret growth rate of the upper bound in terms of T . Since the
regret in the stochastic setting is a function of the model and/or distribution
parameters, two different approaches are pursued in the literature to obtain
bounds for regret: (i) model-dependent (distribution-dependent) approach or
(ii) model-independent (distribution-free) approach. In the model-dependent
approach, the upper and lower bounds for regret is derived as a function of
these model and/or distribution parameters of the problem instance. In the
model-independent approach, the worst case analysis, which evaluates any
given policy in terms of how well it performs under the worst problem instance
for that policy, are used to obtain the upper and lower bounds for regret.
Motivated by two different applications in electricity markets, we study two
different online learning problems. The first one is the online learning and op-
4
timization problem of Markov jump affine models, which falls in the category
of multi-armed bandit problems with continuous action space and convex loss
(or concave reward) function. The second problem studied is the online learn-
ing of optimal bidding strategy in repeated multi-commodity auctions, which
falls in the category of experts problems with high dimensional continuous ac-
tion space and non-concave reward. In the former one, the difficulty lies in the
exploration and exploitation dilemma. In the latter one, the difficulty is to con-
struct an optimal online learning algorithm that is computationally efficient in
high dimensions. For both problems, we consider the stochastic setting with
finite optimization horizon and construct online learning algorithms with op-
timal regret growth rates. All of the regret bounds are derived via the model-
independent approach.
This thesis incorporates materials from five different papers of the author
[10–14], which are coauthored with Lang Tong and Qing Zhao. The part of this
thesis that is related to the online learning and optimization of Markov jump
affine models is based on the contents of [11, 12, 14], and the part of this thesis
that is related to the online learning of optimal bidding strategy in repeated
multi-commodity auctions is based on the contents of [10, 13].
1.2 Online Learning and Optimization of Markov Jump Affine
Models
We consider the problem of online learning and optimization of affine memo-
ryless models with unknown parameters that follow a Markov jump process.
By online learning and optimization we mean that the control input of the un-
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known model is chosen sequentially to minimize the expected total cost or to
maximize the expected cumulative reward procured over a time horizon T . In
this context, the online learning problem is one of exploration and exploitation;
the need of exploring the space of unknown parameters must be balanced by
the need of exploiting the knowledge acquired through learning.
The performance of an online learning policy is measured by the commonly
used performance metric, regret, which is defined by the difference between
the cumulative cost/reward of an online learning policy and that of a decision
maker who knows the model completely and sets the input optimally. As men-
tioned previously, the regret grows monotonically with the time horizon T , and
the rate of growth measures the efficiency of online learning policies.
The online learning problem considered here is particularly relevant in dy-
namic pricing problems when the consumers’ demand is unknown and possibly
varying stochastically [16, 39, 42, 58]. The goal of dynamic pricing is to set the
price sequentially, using the observations from the previous sales, to match a
certain contracted demand. Besides applications in dynamic pricing, results are
also relevant to the learning and control problem of Markov jump linear systems
with unknown parameters [27, 30, 59].
We study the online learning and optimization problem of Markov jump
affine models under two different objectives: (i) target matching with a
quadratic cost and (ii) revenue (profit) maximization. Our goal is to establish
fundamental limits on the rate of regret growth for Markov jump affine models
and develop an online learning policy that achieves the lowest possible regret
growth.
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1.2.1 Motivation: Dynamic Pricing for Demand Response
Demand response is a key component of an efficient energy market due to
its economical and environmental benefits both for system operators and con-
sumers [65]. By means of demand response, such as dynamic pricing or other
incentive based methods, system operator can directly control or indirectly in-
fluence consumer demands to reduce peak demand and minimize the risk of
supply outages.
We consider the use of dynamic pricing in a distribution system by a retailer
such as an energy aggregator or a local utility in the two-settlement wholesale
market framework [39]. In the day-ahead market, the independent system op-
erator receives bids from generators and retailers and determines the optimal
day-ahead dispatch of the next day by solving an optimal power flow problem.
In the real-time market, independent system operator adjusts the day-ahead dis-
patch according to the real-time operating conditions, and the real-time whole-
sale price compensates deviations from the day-ahead schedule.
A retailer is exposed to risks from uncertainties in the wholesale market and
demands of price elastic consumers. On the one hand, the retailer has to commit
to purchase a certain amount of energy at the day-ahead price, and the real-
time fluctuation of the wholesale price represents an unpredictable operating
cost. On the other hand, the consumer it serves adjusts its consumption based
on the set price by the retailer, and how a consumer responds to set prices is
influenced by both the retail price and the exogenous randomness at the time
of consumption such as unexpected changes of weather conditions. Without
knowing how a consumer responds to prices, setting the retail price optimally
seems futile.
7
The Markov jump affine model studied here maps to the demand curve of
price-responsive electricity consumers with control input of the model corre-
sponding to the retail price of electricity. The affine model for demand arises
from the optimization problem of the consumer based on thermal load dynam-
ics [39], and the Markov jump process models the unexpected changes in de-
mand associated with exogenous factors.
1.2.2 Related Work
Without Markov jump as part of the model, i.e., when there is a single state,
the problem considered here is the classical problem of control in experiment
design studied by Anderson and Taylor [4]. Anderson and Taylor proposed a
certainty equivalence rule where the input is determined by using the maximum
likelihood estimates of system parameters as if they were the true parameters.
Despite its intuitive appeal, the Anderson-Taylor rule was shown to be subop-
timal for the quadratic regulation problem by Lai and Robbins in [54] and also
for the revenue maximization problem by den Boer and Zwart in [29]. In fact,
there is a non-zero probability that the Anderson-Taylor rule produces an input
which converges to a suboptimal value for both cases; therefore, this rule results
in incomplete learning and a linear growth of regret.
For the scalar model in which the quadratic cost of the regulation problem is
to be minimized, Lai and Robbins [52] showed that a Robbins-Monro stochastic
approximation approach achieves the optimal regret order of Θ(log T ). Later,
Lai and Wei [53] showed that this regret order is also achievable for a more gen-
eral linear dynamic system by an adaptive regulator that uses least square esti-
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mates of a reparametrized model and ensures convergence via occasional uses
of white-noise probing inputs. The result was further generalized by Lai [51]
to multivariate linear dynamic systems with a square invertible system matrix.
The special case of the problem considered by Lai [51] is studied in [39] in the
context of retail pricing of electricity under unknown demand. The authors
of [39] also proposed a Robbins-Monro type of technique to achieve the optimal
regret rate of Θ(log T ) . Our result can be viewed as a generalization of this line
of work to allow both time-varying linear models and time-invariant models
with a non-invertible system matrix.
The problem studied here also falls into the category of continuum-armed
bandit problem where the control input is chosen from a subset of <n with
the goal of minimizing expected cost (or maximizing expected reward) that is
an unknown continuous function of the input. This problem was introduced
by Agrawal [1] who studied the scalar problem and proposed a policy that
combines certainty equivalence control with Kernel estimator-based learning.
Agrawal showed that this policy has a regret growth rate of O(T 3/4) for a uni-
formly Lipschitz expected cost function. Later, Kleinberg [45] proved that the
optimal growth rate of regret for this problem cannot be smaller than Ω(T 2/3)
and proposed a policy that achieves O(T 2/3(log(T ))1/3). Kleinberg [45] also con-
sidered the multivariate problem , i.e., n > 1, and showed that an adaptation
of Zinkevich’s greedy projection algorithm achieves the regret growth rate of
O(T 3/4) if the cost function is smooth and convex on a closed bounded convex
input set.
Within the continuum-armed bandit formulation, the work of Cope [26] is
particularly relevant because of its use of stochastic approximation to achieve
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the order-optimal regret growth of Ω(
√
T ) for a different class of cost func-
tions. Cope’s results (both the regret lower bound and the Kiefer-Wolfowitz
technique), unfortunately, cannot be applied here because of the time-varying
Markov jump affine models treated here. Also relevant is the work of Rus-
mevichientong and Tsitsiklis [71] on the so-called linearly parameterized bandit
problem where the objective is to minimize a linear cost with input selected from
the unit sphere. A learning policy developed in [71] is shown to achieve the
lower bound of Ω(
√
T ) using decoupled exploration and exploitation phases.
Even though our model is similar to the one in [71] in terms of the observed
output being a linear function of the input, in our problem, the unknown model
parameters follow a Markov jump process and the specific cost functions stud-
ied are quadratic; thus the problem objective is different.
There is a considerable amount of work on dynamic pricing problem with
the objective of revenue maximization under a demand model uncertainty in
different areas such as operations research, statistics, mathematics, and com-
puter science. In [44], a multi-armed bandit approach with a regret growth
rate of O(
√
T log T ) was proposed for a nonparametric formulation of the prob-
lem. See also [22] where the same problem under a general parametric demand
model is considered and a modified version of myopic maximum likelihood
based policy is shown to achieve the regret order of O(
√
T ), and [29] where a
similar result is obtained for a class of parametric demand models. In both [44]
and [22], authors proved that the lower bound for regret growth rate is Ω(
√
T ).
Besides more general classes of demand models, affine model similar to the
one in our work has been also studied extensively; e.g., [16, 42, 58]. In both [16]
and [58], it is shown that approximate dynamic programming solutions may
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outperform greedy method numerically. A special case of our formulation
of revenue maximization problem without any Markov jump characteristics
(with time-invariant model parameters) is previously investigated by Keskin
and Zeevi [42]. Keskin and Zeevi proposed a semi-myopic policy that uses or-
thogonal pricing idea to explore and learn the system. They showed that the
lowest possible regret order is Ω(
√
T ) for any policy, and their semi-myopic pol-
icy achieves this bound up to a logarithmic factor; i.e., O(
√
T log T ).
Even though the system model is assumed to be time-invariant in most of
the literature, there is a considerable amount of work especially in dynamic pric-
ing that deals with time-varying demand models due to unpredictable environ-
mental factors affecting demand; e.g., see [9] for a demand model that evolves
according to a discrete state space Markov chain in a revenue management with
finite inventory problem, and [15] for a dynamic programming formulation of
a profit maximization problem with an unknown demand parameter following
an autoregressive process. See also [41] for a revenue maximization problem
with an affine demand model where the model parameters are time-varying,
yet the cumulative change in the model parameters over the time horizon T is
bounded. Since Keskin and Zeevi [41] measure the regret of a policy by the dif-
ference between the cumulative cost of the policy and that of a clairvoyant who
knows all the future temporal changes exactly and chooses the optimal action,
their characterization of regret is too pessimistic for the Markov jump model
considered here.
Some other examples of related work on online learning with time-varying
models apart from dynamic pricing are [17] and [82]. In [17], Besbes, Gur, and
Zeevi studied the online learning problem of more general time-varying cost
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functions where the cumulative temporal changes is restricted to a budget sim-
ilar to [41]. However, their characterization of regret is also similar to [41] and
thus, incomparable with the one in our work. Yin, Ion, and Krishnamurthy [82]
also considered the problem of estimating a randomly evolving optimum of a
cost function which follows a Markov jump process. Their analysis deals with
the convergence of the estimate obtained via stochastic approximation to the
limit (stationary) solution, whereas here, we are concerned about estimating the
optimum of the cost function at each time instant given the previous state of the
Markov chain. Moreover, different than our work, their analysis relies on the
availability of the noisy observations of the cost function gradient and they do
not characterize regret.
1.2.3 Main Contributions
Our main contribution is the generalization of online learning of time-invariant
affine models to that of Markov jump affine models. It is important to note
that existing online learning algorithms that are used for time-invariant affine
models (e.g., [26,51,52]) are no longer applicable for Markov jump affine models
because the optimal solution becomes a function of the observed state of the
Markov chain, and direct implementations of existing algorithms do not take
into account this observation.
For the generalized model, we propose an online learning policy, referred to
as Markovian simultaneous perturbations stochastic approximation (MSPSA).
By introducing the idea of state tracking, MSPSA extends Spall’s stochastic
approximation method [74] to the optimization problem of an objective func-
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tion that evolves according to a Markov jump process. We show that MSPSA
achieves the optimal regret order of Θ(
√
T ) for two different objective functions
studied for the affine model: (i) quadratic regulation and (ii) the revenue max-
imization. Furthermore, we also show that the control input of MSPSA policy
converges to the optimal solution both with probability one and in mean square
as T → ∞. Therefore, the proposed policy eventually learns the optimal solu-
tion.
A key implication of our results is that, in comparing with Lai’s result on the
learning problem of a time-invariant affine model with the quadratic regulation
objective [51], modulating a linear model by a Markov jump process introduces
substantial learning complexity; hence, the regret order increases from Θ(log T )
to Θ(
√
T ). As a special case, we also show that, even in the absence of Markov
jump, when the system matrix is full column rank but not invertible, the best
regret order is also Θ(
√
T ). It worths noting that adding just one row to a square
and invertible matrix can change the worst case regret from Θ(log T ) to Θ(
√
T ).
The results presented here are obtained using several techniques developed
in different contexts. The MSPSA policy is a generalization of Spall’s stochas-
tic approximation method to the optimization problem of an objective function
following a Markov jump process. To show the optimality of MSPSA, we use
the van Trees inequality [35] to lower bound the estimation error for any policy,
which is a technique used in the literature previously [19,42]. Lastly, a result on
the convergence of non-negative almost supermartingales [69] is used to obtain
the convergence result for MSPSA policy.
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1.3 Online Learning of Optimal Bidding Strategy in Repeated
Multi-Commodity Auctions
Motivated by virtual trading in the wholesale electricity markets, we consider
the problem of optimal bidding in a multi-commodity uniform-price auction
[63], which promotes the law of one price for identical goods. Uniform-price
auction is widely used in practice. Besides virtual trading in electricity market,
which is discussed in detail in the following section, examples include spectrum
auction, the auction of treasury notes, the auction of emission permits (UK).
A mathematical abstraction of multi-commodity uniform-price auction is as
follows. A bidder has K options (goods) to bid on at an auction. With the
objective to maximize his T-period expected profit, at each period, the bidder
determines how much to bid for each option subject to a budget constraint.
In the bidding period t, if a bid for option k is greater than or equal to its
auction clearing price at that period, then the bid is cleared, and the bidder pays
its auction clearing price. His revenue resulting from the cleared bid will be
the option’s spot price (utility) at period t. Hence, the payoff obtained from the
cleared bid for option k is determined by the difference between auction clearing
and spot prices of option k. If the bid for option k is smaller than its auction
clearing price, then the bid is not cleared at that period and the resulting payoff
will be zero.
We assume that the auction clearing and spot prices of all K options are
drawn from an unknown joint distribution. At the end of each period, the bid-
der observes the auction clearing and spot prices of all options. Therefore, be-
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fore choosing the bid of period t, all the information the bidder has is a vector
containing previously observed auction clearing and spot prices. At each pe-
riod, a bidding policy determines the next period’s bid solely based on this ob-
servation history. The performance of any bidding policy is measured by its re-
gret defined by the difference between the total expected payoff of that bidding
policy and that of the optimal bidding strategy under known (auction clearing
and spot) price distribution.
1.3.1 Motivation: Virtual Trading in Electricity Markets
The wholesale electricity market in the United States consists of a day-ahead
and a real-time markets. Market participants submit their bids to buy (and of-
fers to sell) electricity to the day-ahead market approximately one day ahead of
time. The bids and offers cleared in the day-ahead market are financially bind-
ing. The market clearing process sets the day-ahead prices for each hour of the
day and at each location of the network.
In the real-time market, the load (thus the generation) may not match to the
cleared amount in the day-ahead market, and the real-time prices of electric-
ity may also be different from their day-ahead counterparts due to a variety
of reasons, including the unexpected levels of demand and supply, unplanned
outages, unpredictable weather conditions [56], and possibilities of market par-
ticipants exercising market power [68].
Price discrepancies between the day-ahead and real-time markets represent
a form of market inefficiency. To promote price convergence between the two mar-
kets, in early 2000s, virtual trading was introduced in the U.S. electricity mar-
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kets. Virtual trading is a financial mechanism that allows market participants
and external financial entities to arbitrage on the differences between day-ahead
(auction clearing) and real-time (spot) prices. Currently, cleared virtual transac-
tions represent a significant fraction of total energy trade. In 2013, the cleared
virtual transactions in the five major electricity markets was 13% ∗ of the total
load [66].
Empirical and theoretical studies have shown that increased competition
due to virtual trading results in price convergence, thus improving market ef-
ficiency [36–38, 56, 68, 72, 76, 81]. Particularly, it has been argued in [76] that a
virtual trader makes profit if and only if his participation drives the day-ahead
and real-time price difference toward zero. Hence, to reach the socially optimal
dispatch level, it is important that the virtual traders bid optimally. However,
the day-ahead and real-time wholesale prices are random due to uncertainties
in demand, supply, and operation conditions. Therefore, in order to learn the
optimal trading strategy, a virtual trader needs to update his belief using all the
new information, which allows him to adapt his bid accordingly each day.
In an electricity market, there are potentially thousands of trading options.
Due to system congestion and losses, electricity prices vary in time and across
locations. The goal of this work is to develop an online learning approach to
virtual trading where the trader, who is constrained by a certain budget, aims to
determine profitable trading options and distribute his budget among them. By
online learning we mean that bids are constructed sequentially and adaptively
based on the new information available. In particular, we consider the objective
of maximizing the expected total payoff as well as one that involves a mean-
variance type of risk measure.
∗This number goes up to 38% with the inclusion of up-to-congestion transactions of PJM.
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1.3.2 Main Contributions
The main contribution of this work is a polynomial-time online learning algo-
rithm with order-optimal regret rate to the algorithmic bidding problem under
budget constraints in repeated multi-commodity auctions. This result is also
generalized to an objective based on a form of mean-variance risk measure. The
proposed approach falls in the category of empirical risk minimization also re-
ferred to as the follow the leader approach. The main challenge here is that opti-
mizing the payoff (risk) amounts to solving a multiple-choice knapsack problem
that is known to be NP hard [40]. Referred to as dynamic programming on dis-
crete set (DPDS), the proposed approach is inspired by a pseudo-polynomial
dynamic programming approach to 0-1 Knapsack problems. DPDS allocates
the limited budget of the bidder (virtual trader) among K options in polyno-
mial time both in terms of the number of options K and in terms of the time
horizon T .
Note that obtaining the optimal bidding strategy with known price distribu-
tion is itself nontrivial due to the non-convexity of the problem. Our result pro-
vides an algorithmic bidding strategy that converges to the global optimal bid-
ding strategy. We show that the expected payoff of DPDS converges to that of
the optimal strategy under known distribution by a rate no slower than
√
log t/t
which results in a regret upper bound of O(
√
T log T ). By showing that, for any
bidding strategy, the regret is lower bounded by Ω(
√
T ), we prove that DPDS is
order optimal up to a
√
log T term.
A significant part of this work is to evaluate the performance of the proposed
strategy empirically using historical data spanning the time period between
2006 and 2016 of NYISO and PJM energy markets. Extensive empirical analysis
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show that the proposed strategy consistently outperforms benchmark heuristic
methods, derived from other machine learning approaches, and achieves signif-
icant profit. It is worth noting that our empirical results also show that PJM and
NYISO wholesale electricity markets are both profitable although PJM market
presents better opportunities to virtual traders compared to NYISO.
1.3.3 Related Work
Relevant literature falls into two categories. The one that is more directly re-
lated to our work focuses on developing online learning algorithms to similar
problems in the machine learning literature. The second one focuses on under-
standing the effects of virtual trading on the two-settlement electricity market.
The problem formulated here can be viewed in multiple machine learning
perspectives. We highlight below several relevant existing approaches. Since
the bidder can calculate the reward that could have been obtained by selecting
any given bid value regardless of its own decision, our problem falls into the
category of full-feedback version of multi-armed bandit problem, referred to
as experts problem, where the reward of all arms (actions) are observable at the
end of each period regardless of the chosen arm. For the case of finite number of
arms, Kleinberg et al. [46] showed that, for stochastic setting, constant regret is
achievable by choosing the arm with the highest average reward at each period.
A special case of the adversarial setting was studied by Cesa-Bianchi et al. [24]
who provided matching upper and lower bounds in the order of Θ(
√
T ). Later,
Freund and Shapire [34] and Auer et al. [7] showed that the Hedge algorithm, a
variation of weighted majority algorithm [57], achieves the matching bound for
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the general setting. These results, however, do not apply to experts problems
with continuous action spaces.
The stochastic experts problem where the set of arms is an uncountable
compact metric space (X , d) rather than finite was studied by Kleinberg and
Slivkins [47] (see [48] for an extended version). Since there are uncountable
number of arms, it is assumed that, in each period, a payoff function drawn
from an i.i.d. distribution is observed rather than the individual payoff of each
arm. Under the assumption of Lipschitz expected payoff function, they showed
that the instance-specific regret of any algorithm is lower bounded by Ω(
√
T ).
They also showed that their algorithm—NaiveExperts—achieves a regret upper
bound ofO(T γ) for any γ > (b+1)/(b+2) where b is the isometry invariant of the
metric space. Our problem is a special case of the setting studied by Kleinberg
and Slivkins [47]. Unfortunately, the computational complexity of NaiveExperts
grows exponentially with the dimension (number of options in our case). There-
fore, it becomes computationally intractable in practice. Also, the regret lower
bound in [47] doesn’t provide a bound for our problem with a specific payoff.
Krichene et al. [50] studied the adversarial setting and proposed an extension of
the Hedge algorithm, which achieves O(
√
T log T ) regret under the assumption
of Lipschitz payoff functions. For our problem, it is reasonable to assume that
the expected payoff function is Lipschitz; yet it is clear that, at each period, the
payoff realization is a step function which is not Lipschitz. Hence, Lipschitz
assumption of [50] doesn’t hold in our setting.
Stochastic gradient descent methods, which have low computational com-
plexity, have been extensively studied in the literature of continuum-armed ban-
dit [26,33,49]. However, either the concavity or the unimodality of the expected
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payoff function is required for regret guarantees of these methods to hold. This
may not be the case in our problem depending on the underlying distribution
of prices.
A relevant work that takes an online learning perspective for the problem of
a bidder engaging in repeated auctions is Weed et al. [80]. They are motivated
by online advertising auctions and studied the partial information setting∗ of
the same problem as ours, but without a budget constraint. Under the mar-
gin condition, i.e., the probability of auction price occurring in close proximity
of mean utility (spot price) is bounded, they showed that their algorithm, in-
spired by the UCB1 algorithm [6], achieves regret that ranges from O(log T ) to
O(
√
T log T ) depending on how tight the margin condition is. They also pro-
vided matching lower bounds up to a logarithmic factor. However, the analysis
in [80] on the lower bound of regret does not hold for the full information set-
ting we study here. Furthermore, their algorithm cannot be used here due to
the budget constraint. Also, we do not rely on the margin condition.
Some other examples of literature on online learning in repeated auctions
studied the problem of an advertiser who wants to maximize the number of
clicks with a budget constraint [2, 77], or that of a seller who tries to learn the
valuation of its buyer in a posted price auction [3, 64]. The settings considered
in those problems are considerably different from that studied here in the im-
plementation of budget constraints [2, 77], and in the strategic behavior of the
bidder [3, 64].
Indirectly related to this work are works that analyze the impact of virtual
transactions on the overall market efficiency. Theoretical analysis on the im-
∗In their setting, the bidder observes market prices only if his bid is accepted at that period.
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pact of virtual trading was conducted in [76] and [61] from a game theoretic
perspective. Under a single trading location model, these papers analyzed the
Nash equilibrium behavior of virtual traders who have their fixed individual
beliefs about the market. Tang et al. [76] showed that, under Nash equilibrium,
if the belief of virtual traders is correct on average, the price difference between
day-ahead and real-time converges to zero as the number of virtual traders in-
creases. Mather, Bitar, and Poolla [61] presented a simple learning strategy that
guarantee convergence to the Nash equilibrium. However, convergence to Nash
equilibrium doesn’t guarantee price convergence. Different from the problem of
learning the Nash equilibrium in a game theoretic environment with fixed be-
liefs [61], we study the online learning problem of a virtual trader who updates
his belief each day using new observations of day-ahead and real-time prices
in order to converge to the optimal trading strategy. Furthermore, we require
that not only the bidding policy converges to the optimal policy but also the
convergence rate is order-optimal.
Among empirical studies, [56] and [38] are the most relevant to our work.
Both evaluate market efficiency before and after virtual trading by searching for
profitable trading strategies. More specifically, in [56], a chance constraint port-
folio selection problem was solved by estimating the distribution of day-ahead
and real-time price difference, modeled as Gaussian mixture hidden Markov
model, to determine the trading strategy, whereas, in [38], hypothesis testing is
used to determine the existence of a profitable trading strategy at each location.
Empirical analysis using CAISO data shows that virtual trading increases effi-
ciency but the market is still inefficient. Some of the other interesting empirical
studies on the impact of virtual trading are [18, 21, 72], and [36].
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CHAPTER 2
ONLINE LEARNING AND OPTIMIZATION OF MARKOV JUMP AFFINE
MODELS
We study the online learning and optimization of Markov jump affine mod-
els for two different objective functions in this chapter. We start with formulat-
ing the problem. We present the proposed algorithm, MSPSA, and its theoretical
learning guarantees for each of the objectives considered separately. Then, we
explain how the dynamic pricing problem of an electricity retailer maps to the
online learning problem studied here. We conclude the chapter with simulation
study to illustrate the regret growth and convergence of MSPSA algorithm.
2.1 Problem Formulation
The model considered here is an affine model, modulated by an exogenous finite
state time-homogeneous Markov chain (S, P ) where S = {1, · · · , K} is the state
space and P = [pi,j] the transition probability matrix. We assume that the state
space S and the transition matrix P are unknown.
Each state k ∈ S of the Markov chain is associated with an affine model
whose parameters are denoted by θk = (Ak, bk) where Ak ∈ <m×n has full col-
umn rank and bk ∈ <m. All system parameters θ = {θk}Kk=1 are assumed de-
terministic and unknown. At time t, the input-output relation of the system is
given by
yt = Astxt + bst + wt, (2.1)
where xt ∈ <n is the control input, yt ∈ <m the observable output, st ∈ S the
state of the system, and wt ∈ <m is a random vector that captures the system
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noise. It is assumed that the random noise wt is drawn from a possibly state
dependent distribution fst(.) with zero mean (without loss of generality) and
unknown finite variance Σ(st)w . Furthermore, for any t 6= t′, wt and wt′ are condi-
tionally independent given the states st and st′ .
Before choosing the control input of period t, the only information the deci-
sion maker has is a vector It−1 containing its decision and observation history up
to time t− 1, which consists of input vector X t−1 = (x1, · · · , xt−1), output vector
Y t−1 = (y1, · · · , yt−1), state vector St−1 = (s0, · · · , st−1), and a convex compact
set Π ∈ <n containing the optimal input (solution) under known model (which
is explained later on in this section).
Even though the assumption on the Markov process being observable and
exogenous is restrictive, there are ample applications that can be well mod-
eled/approximated by observable and exogenous Markov dynamics. Later,
we will present the dynamic pricing problem of an electricity retailer in detail.
Other relevant applications include data transmission under changing channel
conditions that are exogenous to the message transmitted [83] and control of an
unmanned aerial vehicle where exogenous conditions such as wind affect the
underlying model [5].
The objective of online learning and optimization is to find a control input se-
quence {xt}Tt=1 that minimizes the expected cumulative cost incurred at each
stage. The stage cost at time t is defined as the expected cost incurred at time t
where the expectation is conditioned on the current observation history It−1 and
the control input xt. Due to Markov chain, however, the stage cost J (st−1, xt)
at time t becomes a function of the most recently observed state st−1 and the
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control input xt only.∗ Then, the expected cumulative cost can be expressed as
E
(
T∑
t=1
J (st−1, xt)
)
,
where T is the learning and optimization horizon. Note that the above quan-
tity is a function of the deterministic parameters θ and the distributions P and
{fi}Ki=1.
For a decision maker who wants to minimize its expected cumulative cost,
the difficulty in finding the optimal control input sequence is that the system
parameter θ and the transition matrix P are unknown. If the system parameters
(θ, P ) were known, then the decision maker would have used this information
along with its observation history to determine the optimal decision rule that
minimizes the expected cumulative cost. In that case, the problem could be
formulated as a dynamic program and solved via backward induction. We refer
to this optimal solution under known model as the optimal input and denote it
by {x∗t}Tt=1 (which is made precise in the following sections). As mentioned
before, the optimal input x∗t is contained in the set Π, which is known to the
decision maker.
A policy µ of a decision maker is defined as a sequence of decision rules, i.e.,
µ = (µ0, µ1, · · · , µT−1), such that, at time t−1, µt−1 maps the information history
vector It−1 to the system input xt at time t. We denote the input determined by
policy µ as xµt .
The online learning of Markov jump affine model is depicted in Figure 2.1
by a feedback loop. The unknown variables are indicated in red in the figure.
Here, one can observe how the decision of a policy effects its observation and
∗This can be observed in (2.3), the stage cost for quadratic regulation problem, and in (2.4),
the stage costs for revenue maximization problem.
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Figure 2.1: Online learning of Markov jump affine model
vice versa. The figure also illustrates the idea behind the exploration and ex-
ploitation tradeoff. In order to determine the optimal input accurately, it is nec-
essary to make better predictions regarding the unknown variables. However,
in order to make better predictions, it is crucial to explore the space of possible
inputs to get observations that provide necessary information. So, what you can
exploit is determined by how much you explore. On the other hand, exploring
the space of possible inputs restricts how much you can exploit. Hence, the key
is to find the policy µ that establishes the optimal balance between exploration
and exploitation.
To measure the performance of an online learning policy, we use the regret
measure as a proxy. In particular, the (cumulative) regretRµT (θ, P ) of a learning
policy µ is measured by the difference between the expected cumulative cost of
the decision maker, who follows the policy µ, and that of a decision maker who
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knows the system parameters (θ, P ) and sets the system input optimally, i.e.,
RµT (θ, P ) = E
(
T∑
t=1
J (st−1, xµt )−
T∑
t=1
J (st−1, x∗t )
)
. (2.2)
Since the regret defined above is a function of system parameters, we char-
acterize the performance of µ by the worst case regret
R¯µT ∆= sup
θ,P,{fi}Ki=1
RµT (θ, P ).
Here we are interested in the worst case (but non-adversarial) parameter θ in
a compact set Θ ⊂ <K×m×(n+1), independent of the learning horizon T . For
the worst case analysis, it is assumed that the state space size K, and system
dimensions m and n are fixed. Since Θ is compact, for any θ ∈ Θ and for all
k ∈ S, the largest singular value of Ak is bounded by a positive constant σ¯, and
the parameter bk is bounded by a positive constant b¯, i.e., ‖bk‖2 ≤ b¯. It is also
assumed that the variance of wt is bounded, i.e., E(w2t,i) ≤ σ2w for some positive
constant σw where wt,i denotes the ith entry of wt. The optimal input for the
worst-case parameters (θ, P ) certainly has to be contained in the set Π, and Ak
has to be full column rank for every k ∈ S for the worst-case parameter θ. Note
that R¯µT grows monotonically with T . We are interested in the learning rule that
has the slowest regret growth.
In the following sections, we focus on two different stage costs, hence two
different objective functions. The first is a quadratic cost that arises naturally
from the regulation problem. In particular, the stage cost at time t is given by
J Q(st−1, xt)∆=E
(||y∗ − yt||22|st−1, xt) , (2.3)
where y∗ ∈ <m is a constant target value for output. For the quadratic regulation
26
problem, we assume that the forth order moment of wt is bounded, i.e., E(w4t,i) ≤
σ4w, in addition to the previous boundedness assumptions.
The second stage cost we consider is the minus revenue that arises from
revenue maximization problem (or profit maximization problem since profit can
be expressed as revenue minus total cost). Specifically, the stage cost of period t
is given by
J R(st−1, xt)∆=E (−xᵀt yt|st−1, xt) . (2.4)
Here, the revenue is calculated as the inner product of the input and the output
vector where the entries of the input and the output vector corresponds to the
price and the demand of each product, respectively. Therefore, the input and the
output dimensions match, i .e., m = n, for the revenue maximization problem.
For this objective, it is assumed that the matrix Aj is negative definite for all
j ∈ S which is a reasonable assumption in dynamic pricing problems, e.g., see
[39, 42].
2.2 Online Learning for Quadratic Regulation
In this section, we study the online learning problem with the quadratic cost.
We first derive an expression for regret using the optimal solution under known
model referred to as the optimal input. Then, we introduce an online learning
approach and establish its order optimality via the analysis of its regret growth
rate and the analysis of the minimum regret growth rate achievable by any pol-
icy. We also show that the input of the online learning policy converges to the
optimal input both almost surely and in mean square.
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2.2.1 Optimal Solution Under Known Model and Regret
In order to calculate the regret for any policy, we begin by deriving the optimal
solution of a decision maker who knows the system (θ, P ) in addition to It−1
and aims to minimize the expected cumulative cost, i.e.,
min
{xt}Tt=1
E
(
T∑
t=1
J Q(st−1, xt)
)
. (2.5)
The problem under known model becomes a dynamic program due to the
known (θ, P ). Since the Markov process is exogenous, i.e., independent of the
decision policy, the optimization problem decouples to choosing the system in-
put xt separately for each decision stage with stage cost given in (2.3) which is
equivalent to
J Q(st−1, xt) =
∑
j
pst−1,j
(‖y∗ − Ajxt − bj‖22 + tr(Σ(j)w )) (2.6)
by (2.1). The optimal input x∗t minimizing the stage cost is then given by
x∗st−1 =
(∑
j
pst−1,jA
ᵀ
jAj
)−1(∑
j
pst−1,jA
ᵀ
j (y
∗ − bj)
)
. (2.7)
Thus, the optimal input x∗t ∈ Π at any time t depends only on the system pa-
rameter θ, the transition matrix P , and the previous state st−1. In the sequel, we
use x∗st−1 to represent x
∗
t , dropping the explicit parameter dependency on (θ, P )
in the notation.
Hence, the stage regret at t, which is the expected difference of the stage cost
obtained by policy µ and the stage cost of the optimal input x∗st−1 , can be written
as
rµt (θ, P ) = E
(J Q(st−1, xµt )− J Q(st−1, x∗st−1))
= E
(‖Ast(xµt − x∗st−1)‖22) ,
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which is obtained using the first order optimality condition (FOC) for x∗st−1 . The
T-period regret given in (2.2) can then be expressed as
RµT (θ, P ) = E
(
T∑
t=1
‖Ast(xµt − x∗st−1)‖22
)
. (2.8)
2.2.2 MSPSA: An Online Learning Policy
Here, we present an online learning policy to the quadratic regulation problem
that achieves the slowest regret growth rate possible. Referred to as MSPSA, the
policy is an extension of the simultaneous perturbation stochastic approxima-
tion (SPSA) algorithm proposed by Spall [74] to Markov jump models consid-
ered here.
Spall’s SPSA is a stochastic approximation algorithm that updates the esti-
mate of the optimal input by a stochastic approximation of the objective gradi-
ent. The key step is to generate two consecutive observations corresponding to
two inputs, that are set to be the current optimal-input estimate perturbed by
some random vector in opposite directions, and use them to construct the gra-
dient estimate. In applying this idea to the optimization problem of a Markov
jump system, a complication arises due to the uncertainty associated with the
system state at the time when the system input is determined; consecutive ob-
servations that are used to determine the gradient estimate may correspond to
different system states.
The key idea of MSPSA is to keep track of each state i ∈ S and the estimate
of the optimal input associated with each state i ∈ S. When state i is realized,
the estimate of the optimal input associated with state i is perturbed by some
random vector and this randomly perturbed estimate is used as input for the
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1: for t = 1 to T do
2: if st−1 = i is observed then
3: if state i is observed for the first time then
4: Let xˆi,1 ∈ Π be an arbitrary vector
5: ti ← 0
6: ei ← 0
7: end if
8: if ei = 0 then
9: ti ← ti + 1
10: xt ← xˆi,ti + cti∆ti
where cti = γ
′
i/(N
′
i + ti)
0.25 with some positive constant γ′i and a non-
negative integer N ′i , and ∆ti = [∆ti,1, ...,∆ti,n]
ᵀ with ∆ti,j’s drawn from an
independent and identical distribution that is symmetrical around zero,
and satisfies |∆ti,j| ≤ ξ1 and E(1/∆2ti,j) ≤ ξ2 for some positive constants ξ1
and ξ2.
11: d+i,ti ← ‖yt − y∗‖22
12: ei ← 1
13: else
14: xt ← xˆi,ti − cti∆ti
15: d−i,ti ← ‖yt − y∗‖22
16: ei ← 0
17: Update:
xˆi,ti+1 ←
(
xˆi,ti − ati
(
d+i,ti − d−i,ti
cti
)
∆¯ti
)
Π
(2.9)
where (.)Π denotes the euclidean projection operator onto Π, ∆¯ti =
[1/∆ti,1, ..., 1/∆ti,n]
ᵀ, and ati = γi/(Ni + ti) with some positive constant γi
and a non-negative integer Ni
18: end if
19: end if
20: end for
Figure 2.2: MSPSA algorithm pseudocode for quadratic regulation problem
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next stage. The estimate of the optimal input associated with state i is updated
only when we obtain two observations of the system output corresponding to
two inputs that are generated by perturbing the current estimate in opposite
directions by the same amount right after observing state i.
Details of this implementation is given in Figure 2.2. Whenever a new state
i ∈ S is observed that has not been observed before, MSPSA policy assigns an
arbitrary predetermined vector xˆi,1 ∈ Π as the initial estimate of the optimal
input x∗i (line 3-7 of Figure 2.2). At the beginning of each stage t, MSPSA checks
the previous state st−1 (line 2), and whether any observation is taken using the
most recent optimal-input estimate xˆst−1,tst−1 (line 8) where tst−1 is the number
of times the optimal-input estimate xˆst−1,tst−1 is updated up to time t (Since two
observations, that are taken right after observing state st−1, are used for each
update of xˆst−1,tst−1 , tst−1 is approximately half of the number of times state st−1
is observed up to t.). If an observation has not taken using the most recent
estimate yet, the input for that stage is set to be a randomly perturbed xˆst−1,tst−1
(line 10). Otherwise MSPSA sets the input by perturbing the estimate xˆst−1,tst−1
in the opposite direction by the same amount as the previous one (line 14). Then,
it updates the optimal-input estimate by a stochastic approximation (line 17)
obtained using the stage costs calculated from both observations (line 11 and
15) and projects it onto Π. The constant γ′i of the perturbation gain sequence
cti should be chosen larger in the high noise setting for an accurate gradient
estimate. The choice of the sequence ati used for the update step determines the
step size. The non-negative integers Ni of ati and N
′
i of cti can be set to zero as
default, but if the update of the optimal-input estimate fluctuates between the
borders of Π at the beginning of the MSPSA policy, setting Ni greater than zero
can prevent this fluctuation.
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2.2.3 Regret Analysis for MSPSA
With MSPSA, we present the idea of state tracking that is applied to SPSA al-
gorithm to deal with the Markov jump dynamics. Even though applying the
idea of state tracking is an intuitive extension, it is not obvious if this type of
extension of existing methods that are used for time-invariant case would ac-
tually converge to the optimal solution. For example, when the same idea of
state tracking is applied to Robbins-Monro algorithm, (which has optimal regret
growth for the time invariant setting of the quadratic regulation problem with
negative definite system matrix) the solution converges to a sub-optimal point
resulting in a linear regret growth. Yet, we show that it is possible to achieve re-
gret growth rate ofO(
√
T ) with MSPSA that introduces the idea of state tracking
applied to SPSA algorithm. We also show that the input generated by MSPSA
converges to the optimal solution both almost surely and in mean square.
We now analyze the regret performance of MSPSA. Let λmin(.) denote the
minimum eigenvalue operator, and ei,ti = E (‖xˆi,ti − x∗i ‖22|i, ti) be the mean
squared error (MSE) between the optimal input x∗i and its estimate xˆi,ti given
state i and ti, where ti, as defined in previous section, is the number of times the
estimate xˆi,ti has been updated up to time t by MSPSA. The following lemma
provides a bound for the decreasing rate of ei,ti , and hence the convergence rate
of the estimate to its true value in terms of the number of times the estimate is
updated and thus in terms of the number of times the state i has occurred up to
t (which is equal either to 2ti or to 2ti − 1). It shows that the MSE converges to
zero with a rate equal or faster than the inverse of the square root of the number
of times state i has occurred.
Lemma 1. For any i ∈ S, if γi ≥ 1/(8λmin(
∑
j pi,jA
ᵀ
jAj)) then there exists a constant
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Ci > 0 satisfying ei,ti ≤ Ci/
√
ti for any (θ, P, {fi}Ki=1).
Proof. See Appendix.
To satisfy the condition of Lemma 1, the decision maker, who follows
MSPSA, needs to have some information about a lower bound on the minimum
eigenvalue of
∑
j pi,jA
ᵀ
jAj , e.g., knowing a non-trivial lower bound ¯
σ for the sin-
gular values of the system matrices. This assumption may not be restrictive in
practice since the decision maker can set γi sufficiently large.
Let the worst-case cumulative input-MSE E¯µT be the worst-case cumulative
MSE between the input xµt of policy µ and the optimal input x∗st−1 , i.e.,
E¯µT ∆= sup
θ,P,{fi}Ki=1
E
(
T∑
t=1
‖xµt − x∗st−1‖22
)
.
Using the result of Lemma 1, we provide a bound for the growth rate of the
worst-case cumulative input-MSE and the worst-case regret of MSPSA. Theo-
rem 1 shows that the MSPSA policy achieves the regret growth rate of O(
√
T ).
Theorem 1. If γi ≥ 1/(8λmin(
∑
j pi,jA
ᵀ
jAj)) for every i ∈ S, then there exist some
positive constants C and C ′ such that
E¯MSPSAT ≤ C
√
T ,
and
R¯MSPSAT ≤ C ′
√
T .
Proof. The input of MSPSA xMSPSAt is equal to either xˆi,ti + cti∆ti or xˆi,ti − cti∆ti
given st−1 = i and ti. By Lemma 1, observe that
ri,ti = E
(‖xˆi,ti ± cti∆ti − x∗i ‖22|i, ti)
= ei,ti + c
2
ti
E
(
∆ᵀti∆ti
) ≤ C ′i/√ti (2.10)
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where C ′i = Ci + (γ′i)2nξ21 . Let Ti be the number of times the estimate of the
optimal input associated with state i has been updated until period T . Because
MSPSA uses two observations per update, we can express the worst-case cumu-
lative input-MSE for MSPSA as
E¯MSPSAT = sup
θ,P,{fi}Ki=1
E
(
K∑
i=1
Ti∑
ti=1
2ri,ti
)
.
By (2.10), we bound
∑Ti
ti=1
2ri,ti ≤ C0
√
Ti where C0 = 4 maxi∈SC ′i. Since Ti is
smaller than the number of times state i is observed, which is a fraction of T for
any P , E¯MSPSAT ≤ C
√
T where C =
√
KC0. Consequently, by (2.8) and using the
upper bound σ¯ for the singular values of Ast , R¯MSPSAT ≤ σ¯2E¯MSPSAT ≤ C ′
√
T where
C ′ = σ¯2C.
According to Theorem 1, the average regret converges to zero with a rate
equal or faster than 1/
√
T . Hence, it proves that the average performance of
MSPSA policy approaches to that of the optimal solution under known model
as T →∞. However, this does not imply the convergence of the MSPSA policy
to the optimal input. The following theorem provides both almost sure and
mean square convergence of MSPSA policy to the optimal input.
Theorem 2. For the quadratic regulation problem,
Pr
(
lim
T→∞
‖xMSPSAT − x∗sT−1‖22 = 0
)
= 1, (2.11)
and
lim
T→∞
E
(
‖xMSPSAT − x∗sT−1‖22
)
= 0. (2.12)
Proof. See Appendix.
Theorem 2 shows that, the input generated by MSPSA converges to its op-
timal value as T → ∞ for any choice of γi > 0. Hence, the condition given
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in Theorem 1 is not necessary for the convergence of MSPSA policy. The intu-
ition is as follows; for any observed recurrent state i ∈ S, the input of MSPSA
converges to its optimal value at time periods when the previous state is i as
T → ∞, and any observed transient state i ∈ S will occcur only a finite num-
ber of times. Therefore, the input of MSPSA converges to its optimal value as
T →∞.
2.2.4 A Lower Bound on the Growth Rate of Regret
We now show that MSPSA in fact provides the slowest possible regret growth.
To this end, we provide a lower bound of regret growth for all decision policies.
For any policy µ, the estimate of the optimal input and the actual input of
the policy may not be the same; for example, the input of MSPSA is a randomly
perturbed estimate of the optimal input and not the estimate itself. Hence, let’s
denote an optimal-input estimate obtained using the past observations corre-
sponding to inputs of policy µ at time t by xˆµt and the input at time t by x
µ
t . We
define the worst-case cumulative estimation-MSE as
EˆµT ∆= sup
θ,P,{fi}Ki=1
E
(
T∑
t=1
‖xˆµt − x∗st−1‖22
)
.
In particular, the following theorem states that the product of the growth
rate of the worst-case cumulative input-MSE E¯µT and the worst-case cumulative
estimation-MSE EˆµT of any sequence {xˆµt }Tt=1 cannot be lower than T for any pol-
icy µ.
Theorem 3. For any value of K > 1, there exists a constant C > 0 such that, for any
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policy µ,
EˆµT E¯µT ≥ CT. (2.13)
Proof. See Appendix.
Theorem 3 shows the trade-off between exploration (minimizing the esti-
mation error) and exploitation (minimizing the input error): the product of the
cumulative estimation-MSE and the cumulative input-MSE grows linearly with
T for any policy. This result implies that if the goal is to minimize the cumu-
lative estimation-MSE rather than the regret, then it is possible to find a policy
for which EˆµT grows slower than
√
T in which case the cumulative input-MSE E¯µT
has to grow faster than
√
T . In fact, if the perturbation gain sequence cti is set
to be constant rather than a decreasing sequence of ti, by following the proof of
Theorem 1, it is easy to show that MSPSA’s cumulative estimation-MSE grows
no faster than log T whereas its regret would grow linearly with T .
However, the slowest growth rate of E¯µT cannot be slower than that of EˆµT for
the optimal choice of the estimate sequence {xˆµt }Tt=1 (in other words, one can
always take the estimate equal to the input, i.e., xˆµt = x
µ
t , in which case EˆµT = E¯µT ).
Therefore, the growth rate of the worst-case cumulative input-MSE E¯µT , and,
consequently, the growth rate of the worst-case regret cannot be lower than
√
T
for any policy µ. Hence, the regret growth rate of MSPSA is the optimal one and
achieves the lower bound Ω(
√
T ), which is stated in Theorem 4.
Theorem 4. For any value of K > 1, there exist some constants C ′, C ′′ > 0 such that,
for any policy µ,
E¯µT ≥ C ′
√
T , (2.14)
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and
R¯µT ≥ C ′′
√
T . (2.15)
Proof. We choose the estimate xˆµt equal to the input x
µ
t . Then, by Theorem 3,
we have (E¯µT )2 ≥ CT . As a result, C ′ =
√
C. Let θ¯ ∈ Θ be the parame-
ter satisfying E(
∑T
t=1 ‖xµt − x∗st−1‖22|θ¯) = E¯µT . In the proof of Theorem 3, we
fixed pi,j = 1/K for any i, j ∈ S. Hence, by (2.8), RµT (θ¯, P ) ≥ ¯σE¯
µ
T where
¯
σ = minθ∈Θ λmin(
∑
j A
ᵀ
jAj/K) > 0 by the extreme value theorem. Then, the
worst case regret R¯µT ≥ RµT (θ¯, P ) ≥ C ′′
√
T where C ′′ =
¯
σC ′.
To prove Theorem 3, we consider a hypothetical case in which the decision
maker receives additional observations at each period t. It is assumed that the
additional observations provided to the decision maker are the observation val-
ues corresponding to input xµt from the states that didn’t occur at t. Since such
observations can’t increase the growth rate of regret of the optimal policy, we
establish a lower bound for this case by showing that it becomes equivalent to a
single state case withm > n and using the multivariate van Trees inequality [35]
in a similar way as in [42]. If K = 1 and m > n, the proofs of Theorem 3 and
Theorem 4 lead to the result regarding the single state case given in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1. For K = 1 and for any value of m and n satisfying m > n, there exist
some constants C,C ′, C ′′ > 0 such that, for any policy µ, inequalities (2.13), (2.14),
and (2.15) hold.
As mentioned in related work, it has been shown that for K = 1 and m = n
case, the regret growth rate is Θ(log T ) [51]. We show that the characteristics of
regret growth changes from Θ(log T ) to Θ(
√
T ) for Markov jump system. Ad-
ditionally, Corollary 1 states that, even in the absence of Markov jump, when
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system matrix A is not invertible, the best regret growth rate also jumps from
Θ(log T ) to Θ(
√
T ). The most significant difference from the single state case
with invertible system matrix is that the cost function for Markov jump system
or for single state system with m > n given in (2.6) is not the root of the cost
function as in the case of K = 1 with m = n, and decision maker can’t under-
stand how close it is to the minimum just by looking at its observations.
2.3 Online Learning for Revenue Maximization
The single state setting of the revenue maximization problem has been previ-
ously studied by Keskin and Zeevi [42]. Here, we consider the more general set-
ting where the affine demand parameters can change depending on the state of
nature, more precisely the setting where demand parameters follows a Markov
jump process.
As for the quadratic regulation objective, to obtain a regret expression for
revenue maximization objective, we first determine the optimal solution of a
decision maker who knows the system (θ, P ). Then, we present MSPSA policy
for revenue maximization problem and establish its optimality in regret perfor-
mance and its convergence to the optimal solution.
2.3.1 Optimal Solution Under Known Model and Regret
By following the same argument as before, under known model, the optimal
solution of a decision maker aimed at minimizing the expected cumulative cost
given in (2.5), which is equal to minus expected T-period revenue, is to choose
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the system input minimizing the respective stage cost given in (2.4). By using
(2.1), this stage cost can be written as
J R(st−1, xt) = −
∑
j
pst−1,jx
ᵀ
t (Ajxt + bj) . (2.16)
The optimal input x∗t , which depends only on (θ, P ) and the previous state st−1,
is then given by
x∗st−1 = −
(∑
j
pst−1,j
(
Aj + A
ᵀ
j
) )−1(∑
j
pst−1,jbj
)
,
by dropping the explicit dependency of x∗t on (θ, P ) in the notation.
Using the FOC for the optimal input x∗st−1 , we obtain the stage regret of a
policy µ, i.e.,
rµt (θ, P ) = E
(J R(st−1, xµt )− J R(st−1, x∗st−1))
= −E
((
xµt − x∗st−1
)ᵀ
Ast
(
xµt − x∗st−1
))
.
Since Ast is negative definite, the stage regret is always non-negative. Conse-
quently, the T-period regret is given by
RµT (θ, P ) = −E
(
T∑
t=1
(
xµt − x∗st−1
)ᵀ
Ast
(
xµt − x∗st−1
))
. (2.17)
2.3.2 MSPSA Policy for Revenue Maximization
Here, we present the MSPSA policy for revenue maximization objective. The
only difference between the two problems considered is their respective stage
costs (objectives). Therefore, the only change in MSPSA policy is how the stage
costs are calculated to approximate the objective gradient which corresponds to
line 11 and 15 of Figure 2.2. In the corresponding steps of MSPSA policy for
revenue maximization, that is given in Figure 2.3 in details, the stage costs are
calculated as minus the observed revenue at that stage.
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1: for t = 1 to T do
2: if st−1 = i is observed then
3: if state i is observed for the first time then
4: Let xˆi,1 ∈ Π be an arbitrary vector
5: ti ← 0
6: ei ← 0
7: end if
8: if ei = 0 then
9: ti ← ti + 1
10: xt ← xˆi,ti + cti∆ti
where cti = γ
′
i/(N
′
i + ti)
0.25 with some positive constant γ′i and a non-
negative integer N ′i , and ∆ti = [∆ti,1, ...,∆ti,n]
ᵀ with ∆ti,j’s drawn from an
independent and identical distribution that is symmetrical around zero,
and satisfies |∆ti,j| ≤ ξ1 and E(1/∆2ti,j) ≤ ξ2 for some positive constants ξ1
and ξ2.
11: d+i,ti ← −xᵀt yt
12: ei ← 1
13: else
14: xt ← xˆi,ti − cti∆ti
15: d−i,ti ← −xᵀt yt
16: ei ← 0
17: Update:
xˆi,ti+1 ←
(
xˆi,ti − ati
(
d+i,ti − d−i,ti
cti
)
∆¯ti
)
Π
(2.18)
where (.)Π denotes the euclidean projection operator onto Π, ∆¯ti =
[1/∆ti,1, ..., 1/∆ti,n]
ᵀ, and ati = γi/(Ni + ti) with some positive constant γi
and a non-negative integer Ni.
18: end if
19: end if
20: end for
Figure 2.3: MSPSA algorithm pseudocode for revenue maximization problem
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2.3.3 MSPSA Performance and Regret Lower Bound
To obtain the regret growth rate for MSPSA policy for revenue maximization,
we first derive an upper bound on how fast the estimate xˆi,ti of the optimal input
x∗i converges to its true value as we did for the regulation problem. Lemma 2
shows that the conditional MSE ei,ti between the optimal input and its estimate
converges to zero with a rate no smaller than the inverse of the square root of
the number of times the estimate xˆi,ti is updated by MSPSA.
Lemma 2. For any i ∈ S, if γi ≥ 1/(8λmin(−
∑
j pi,j(Aj +A
ᵀ
j )/2)) then there exists a
constant Ci > 0 satisfying ei,ti ≤ Ci/
√
ti for any (θ, P, {fi}Ki=1).
Proof. See Appendix.
The condition of Lemma 2 is slightly different than that of Lemma 1. The
bound on the step size constant γi depends on the minimum eigenvalue of
−∑j pi,j(Aj + Aᵀj )/2. This difference is due to the choice of a different stage
cost. However, the information of a non-trivial lower bound
¯
σ on the singular
values of the system matrices is still sufficient to satisfy this condition.
Using the result of Lemma 2, we prove that MSPSA achieves the regret
growth rate of O(
√
T ) for revenue maximization objective as given in Theo-
rem 5, and the input of MSPSA converges to the optimal input both almost
surely and in mean square as given in Theorem 6.
Theorem 5. If γi ≥ 1/(8λmin(−
∑
j pi,j(Aj +A
ᵀ
j )/2)) for every i ∈ S, then there exist
some positive constants C and C ′ such that
E¯MSPSAT ≤ C
√
T ,
41
and
R¯MSPSAT ≤ C ′
√
T .
Proof. Same as the proof of Theorem 1 up to the step that E¯MSPSAT ≤ C
√
T is
obtained. Then, by the regret given in (2.17) for revenue maximization objec-
tive and the fact that −(Aj + Aᵀj )/2 is positive definite with eigenvalues upper
bounded by σ¯, R¯MSPSAT ≤ σ¯E¯MSPSAT ≤ C ′
√
T where C ′ = σ¯C.
Theorem 6. For revenue maximization problem,
Pr
(
lim
T→∞
‖xMSPSAT − x∗sT−1‖22 = 0
)
= 1,
and
lim
T→∞
E
(
‖xMSPSAT − x∗sT−1‖22
)
= 0.
Proof. In the proof of Lemma 2, we showed that (A.4) holds for any state i ∈ S.
Therefore, the proof follows the proof of Theorem 2.
Previously, for single state setting of this problem, Keskin and Zeevi [42]
have shown that for any policy µ the worst case regret growth for this problem
cannot be smaller than Ω(
√
T ) and they have shown that O(
√
T log T ) is achiev-
able by a semi-myopic policy that they referred to as multivariate constrained
iterated least squares (MCILS) policy. Here, we showed that it is possible to
achieve the lower bound Ω(
√
T ) given in [42] by MSPSA policy for more gen-
eral problem with Markov jumped demand.
Next, we generalize Keskin and Zeevi’s lower bound result to Markov jump
case by showing that for any policy µ and for any state space size K ≥ 1,
the growth rate of worst-case regret is bounded by Ω(
√
T ), and hence MSPSA
achieves the optimal rate of Θ(
√
T ).
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Theorem 7. For any value of K ≥ 1, there exist some constants C,C ′ > 0 such that,
for any policy µ,
EˆµT E¯µT ≥ C2T, (2.19)
E¯µT ≥ C
√
T , (2.20)
and
R¯µT ≥ C ′
√
T . (2.21)
Proof. See Appendix.
2.4 Dynamic Pricing for Demand Response
In this section, we explain how the dynamic pricing problem of an electricity
retailer maps to the online learning problem of Markov jump affine model in
detail. To do this, we first introduce a real-time pricing mechanism that allows
the electricity retailer to set the hourly retail price one day in advance and al-
lows consumers to adjust their consumption ahead of time. Then, we present
the demand model arising from the optimization problem of consumers based
on thermal load dynamics and the dynamic pricing mechanism discussed. We
conclude the section by discussing that the retail surplus optimization can be
formulated either as a target matching problem or as a revenue maximization
problem depending on the underlying assumptions.
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2.4.1 Dynamic Pricing Model
The day-ahead hourly pricing mechanism, that has been used in practice by a
number of utilities [20, 65], works as follows:
• The retailer posts next day’s hourly retail price vector x ∈ <24, where ith
entry corresponds to ith hour price, to its customers one day ahead and
keeps it fixed.
• A consumer participating the program optimizes its real-time consump-
tion based on x and makes a payment to the retailer in the amount of x
times its real-time consumption.
• In the real-time wholesale market, the retailer purchases the amount of
actual demand that deviates from the day-ahead schedule by paying the
real-time wholesale price.
This mechanism provides customers 24 hour price certainty as well as ser-
vice guarantee. It gives customers the freedom to optimize their consumption
and reduce their electricity bills.
2.4.2 Price Responsive Demand
Thermal load represents a significant part of residential electricity consump-
tion. Therefore, we consider a price responsive demand based on the thermal
load dynamics. By solving a stochastic optimization problem with the aim of
maximizing the consumer utility which is a linear combination of the cost of
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electricity and the expected discomfort level, in [39], it is shown that the opti-
mal aggregate residential demand can be expressed as an affine function of the
retail price.
Since the consumer utility in the case of thermal load depends on weather
conditions, we assume that the affine function parameters of the aggregate de-
mand follow a Markov jump process with a finite state space S = {1, ..., K} and
a state transition probability matrix P = [pi,j]. Here, the state of the day is deter-
mined by the exogenous factors (which are independent of the retail price) such
as the weather condition at that day. Let st ∈ S and xt ∈ <24 be the state and the
retail price vector at day t, respectively. Then, at day t, the observed real-time
demand yt ∈ <24 with ith entry representing the aggregate demand in ith hour
from all customers in the service area is given as
yt = Astxt + bst + wt (2.22)
where bst ∈ <24 and negative definite Ast ∈ <24×24, which captures the inter-
temporal dependencies, are state dependent parameters of the affine demand.
The random vector wt ∈ <24 captures the noise in the thermal system. Hence,
the demand model corresponds to the Markov jump affine model presented in
Section 2.1 where the retail price vector is the control input, and the aggregate
customer demand is the observed output.
2.4.3 Online Learning for Dynamic Pricing
In a two-settlement market, the retailer commits to buy its day-ahead schedule
yDAt ∈ <24 at the day-ahead wholesale price λt ∈ <24 of day t, cleared on day
t − 1, and pays λᵀt yDAt . In the real-time wholesale market on day t, the retailer
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purchases the amount of actual consumption of its customers that deviates from
the day-ahead schedule by paying the real-time wholesale price pit. Let u(y)
denote the utility of the retailer for getting served with y units of electricity
in the wholesale market. Then, the retail surplus on day t can be written as
u(yt)− λᵀt yDAt − piᵀt (yt − yDAt ).
Next, we show that the retail surplus optimization can be viewed either as
a target matching problem with a quadratic cost or as a revenue maximization
problem depending on the underlying assumptions. Since both of these prob-
lems are studied in the previous sections, all of the results presented previously
for each objective follow.
Matching the day-ahead dispatch level
Under the assumption of a quadratic generator cost function, it has been shown
that the retail surplus loss is approximately measured by the normed squared
deviation of the actual demand from its day-ahead schedule, i.e., ‖yt−yDAt ‖22 [39].
Consequently, for a constant day-ahead dispatch level yDAt = y∗, optimiz-
ing the expected T-period retail profit becomes equivalent to the optimization
problem presented in 2.1 with stage cost expressed by the quadratic cost (2.3) of
the regulation problem. Here, the day-ahead dispatch level corresponds to the
target value for customer demand observed.
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Pure profit maximization
If we set the utility u(yt) of the retailer equal to its total revenue x
ᵀ
t yt from its
customers, the retail profit (surplus) on day t can be written as (xt − pit)ᵀyt −
(λt − pit)ᵀyDAt . Here, we assume that the retailer is a price taker. Hence, demand
yt is independent of the real-time wholesale price pit given the state st. We also
assume that the real-time wholesale price pit has an unknown state dependent
distribution gst(.) with bounded mean p¯ist and bounded finite variance. Fur-
thermore, pit and pit′ are conditionally independent given states st and st′ for
any t 6= t′.
In this setting, the unknown system parameter vector θ includes {p¯ik}Kk=1 in
addition to {Ak, bk}Kk=1, and the observation vector It−1 additionally includes
past day-ahead wholesale prices {λi}ti=1, real-time wholesale prices {pii}t−1i=1, and
day-ahead dispatch levels {yDAi }ti=1.
Then, the optimal price x∗t under known model is determined by maximizing
the (expected) stage profit, i.e.,
J (st−1, xt) =
∑
j
pst−1,j
[
(xt − p¯ij)ᵀ(Ajxt + bj)− (λt − p¯ij)ᵀyDAt
]
,
and is expressed by
x∗st−1 = −
(∑
j
pst−1,j(Aj + A
ᵀ
j )
)−1(∑
j
pst−1,j(bj − Aᵀj p¯ij)
)
.
Observe that the loss (or the gain) resulting from buying day-ahead dispatch
level λDAt from day-ahead wholesale market instead of real-time wholesale mar-
ket does not affect the optimal value of the retail price here due to the risk-
neutral objective∗ (see stage profit expression). However, the expected real-time
∗Expected profit maximization objective doesn’t take the risk resulting from the uncertainty
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wholesale price is still an important factor to determine the optimal value of the
retail price. From the expression for stage profit, one can see that if the expected
real-time price is high, then it is crucial to set the retail price high as well to be
able to obtain a non-negative profit. Consequently, high retail price will lead to
a reduced demand.
It is easy to show that, for this setting, the stage regret and T-period regret
is equivalent to the ones given in Section 2.3. The MSPSA policy can be im-
plemented as given in Figure 2.3 with a slight change: Since the objective is to
optimize profit rather than revenue, one needs to assign d+i,ti (line 11) and d
−
i,ti
(line 15) to−(xt−pit)ᵀyt instead of−xᵀt yt. All of the theoretical results presented
in Section 2.3 remain valid.
2.5 Simulation
We present simulation results to illustrate the growth rate of regret and the
optimal-input estimate convergence of MSPSA policy both for quadratic reg-
ulation and revenue maximization problems. Note that, by these simulation
examples, we can only exhibit the performance of ”typical” parameters and not
the worst-case performance as studied in the theoretical characterization of re-
gret.
For a benchmark comparison, we consider the greedy least square estimate
(LSE) method proposed by Anderson and Taylor [4]. At each period, the greedy
LSE determines the input by using the least square estimates of system parame-
ters as if they were the true parameters and projects it onto the set Π. In order to
in the real-time wholesale price into account.
48
0 20 40 60 80 1000
2
4
6
8
10
12x 10
4
√
T
R
eg
re
t
 
 
MSPSA
Greedy LSE
(a) Regret w.r.t.
√
T
100 101 102 103 104
10−1
100
101
102
tM
S
E
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
x
∗ s
t
−
1
a
n
d
it
s
e
s
t
im
a
 
 
MSPSA
Greedy LSE
(b) Optimal-input estimate MSE w.r.t. t
Figure 2.4: Average performance of MSPSA and Greedy LSE for quadratic
regulation example.
calculate the initial LSEs of the system parameters, the first samples correspond-
ing to the inputs generated by perturbing the initial input 5% in each direction
are taken until the LSE of θ is computationally tractable. Although, in general,
greedy LSE performs well numerically [4], it was shown that it can lead to in-
complete learning and may not converge with positive probability which causes
linear growth in regret [54].
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2.5.1 Numerical Example for Quadratic Regulation Problem
To illustrate the performance of MSPSA policy for quadratic regulation prob-
lem, we consider the problem studied in [39], i.e., the problem of an electricity
retailer who wants to set hourly electricity prices for the next day to meet its
predetermined quantity y∗ in demand for each hour. Therefore, the system di-
mension was set to be m = n = 24 where each dimension corresponds to an
hour of the day. Different than [39] where the demand is time-invariant, it is
assumed that the demand of its customers changes depending on the state of
the day, e.g., weather conditions, which follows a Markov jump process. For
this example, we considered two states and set the transition probability from
any state to the same state to be 0.6 and to the other state to be 0.4. To calculate
the average performance, 104 Monte Carlo runs were used.
Figure 2.4 shows the average performance of MSPSA and greedy LSE for
this quadratic regulation example. The set Π = [1, 4]24, and initial input was set
to be the vector of all 4s for both policies. Target value y∗ was taken as the vector
of all 5s. For each i ∈ S, Ai and bi were chosen such that all eigenvalues of Ai
belong to the interval [−1.5,−0.5] and the optimal solution associated with each
state is contained in Π. The noise wt was taken as i.i.d. normal with covariance
0.52I24. The MSPSA parameters were set to be ati = 1/(8 × 0.5)/(ti + 10) and
cti = 1/t
0.25
i ; ∆ti,j’s were drawn from Bernoulli(0.5) with values {+1,−1}.
In Figure 2.4a, we plot the regret of both policies with respect to square root
of the time horizon. We observe that the T-period regret of MSPSA grows lin-
early with
√
T , which is consistent with the theoretical upper bound. On the
other hand, the regret of greedy LSE seems to grow faster than linear. Therefore,
we observe that MSPSA outperforms greedy LSE and the difference between the
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performance of two policies is getting bigger as T increases.
Figure 2.4b illustrates how averaged normed squared error between the opti-
mal input and its estimate changes with time in a log-log plot. From Theorem 2,
we know that the optimal-input estimate and thus the input itself converges
in mean square for MSPSA. In Figure 2.4b, we observe that the convergence of
MSPSA is consistent with this result. Furthermore, the logarithm of the esti-
mation error seems to decrease almost linearly with the logarithm of the time
horizon. In other words, MSE seems to converge with a rate equal to 1/
√
t. This
is reasonable because in Lemma 1, we show that, for each i ∈ S, the estimation
error decreases with a rate equal or faster than the inverse of the square root of
the number of times state i is observed. On the other hand, convergence trend
for greedy LSE seems to be much slower and it performs poorly compared with
MSPSA’s performance.
2.5.2 Numerical Example for Revenue Maximization Problem
Here, we present an example for revenue maximization problem with system
size n = 10 and 3 different states where the transition probability from any state
to the same state was set to be 0.4 and to any other state to be 0.3. The set
Π = [0.75, 2]10, and initial input was set to be the vector of all 1.375s for both
policies. For each i ∈ S, Ai and bi were chosen such that all eigenvalues of Ai
belong to the interval [−1.3,−0.3] and the optimal solution associated with each
state is contained in Π. The noise wt was taken as i.i.d. normal with covariance
0.32I24. The MSPSA parameters were set to be ati = 1/(8 × 0.3)/(ti + 10) and
cti = 0.75/t
0.25
i ; ∆ti,j’s were drawn from Bernoulli(0.5) with values {+1,−1}. We
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Figure 2.5: Average performance of MSPSA and Greedy ILS for revenue maxi-
mization example.
used 104 Monte Carlo runs to calculate the average performance of both policies.
The average performance of MSPSA and greedy LSE for this example with
revenue maximization objective is given in Figure 2.5. The regret growth and
the convergence of averaged normed squared error between the optimal input
and its estimate are illustrated in Figure 2.5a and Figure 2.5b, respectively. In
both plots, we observe a trend similar to the previous example even though
the regret characterizations and the optimal inputs are different due to differ-
ent objectives. Figure 2.5a shows that MSPSA’s regret grows linearly with
√
T
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whereas greedy LSE’s regret grows almost exponentially with
√
T . Therefore,
we observe that MSPSA eventually outperforms greedy LSE as T increases even
though greedy LSE performs better at the beginning of the time horizon. Fig-
ure 2.5b shows that, after a slight increase at the beginning of the time horizon,
the logarithm of the estimation error of MSPSA decreases linearly with the log-
arithm of the time horizon and becomes sufficiently small; whereas the estima-
tion error of Greedy LSE stays almost constant except the spike that is proba-
bly due to the poor initial LSEs. Overall, we can say that MSPSA outperforms
greedy LSE in both numerical examples.
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CHAPTER 3
ONLINE LEARNING OF OPTIMAL BIDDING STRATEGY IN REPEATED
MULTI-COMMODITY AUCTIONS
In this chapter, we develop an online learning algorithm to the problem of op-
timal bidding in repeated multi-commodity auctions. First, we start explaining
our motivating application, virtual trading in electricity markets, in detail and
present the mathematical problem formulation. Then, we explain our online
learning approach and show the optimality of its regret growth rate. We con-
clude the chapter with a comprehensive empirical study that is conducted with
the data obtained from NYISO and PJM energy markets to illustrate the perfor-
mance of the proposed algorithm for the motivating example and a simulation
study to illustrate the regret performance.
3.1 Virtual Trading in Electricity Markets
3.1.1 Virtual Transactions in Two-Settlement Market System
A virtual transaction on any given day (session) involves transactions in the
day-ahead (DA) and real-time (RT) markets for power at a particular location
and in a particular hour. Herein we refer to each location-hour pair with which
a transaction is associated as a trading option. Typically, two types of virtual
transactions are allowed in the US wholesale electricity markets: (i) virtual de-
mand bid and (ii) virtual supply bid. A virtual demand bid is a bid to buy en-
ergy in the DA market with an obligation to sell back exactly the same amount
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in the RT market. A virtual supply bid is a bid to sell energy in the DA market
with an obligation to buy back exactly the same amount in the RT market.
The DA market takes place one day ahead of the actual power delivery. In
the DA market, the independent system operator receives bids from (actual)
generators and load serving entities as well as virtual bidders. After the DA
market closes on day t − 1, the bids in the DA market are processed by the
independent system operator via a security constrained economic dispatch that
accepts a subset of virtual bids and determines the amount of power to generate
for each generator and the associated DA prices.
The RT market takes place at the time of actual power delivery on day t. The
independent system operator adjusts the dispatch level according to the actual
system operating conditions and compute the RT prices. The virtual bids that
are accepted in the DA market are settled in the RT market, and a virtual bidder
with an accepted bid is paid at the difference of the DA and RT prices. See the
more precise mathematical description of the settlement process in Sec. 3.1.2.
3.1.2 A Mathematical Model of Virtual Trading
Here we introduce a model for virtual trading. Recall that a trading option
is defined by a pair of a location and a particular time of power delivery. A
location can be a bus of the transmission grid or a trading zone. The time of
power delivery is a specific hour in a 24 hour trading horizon.
Let λt,k and pit,k be the DA and RT prices (in $/MWh) of option k on day t,
respectively. Let xt,k be a virtual bid (in $/MWh) for option k on day t. A virtual
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demand bid is a bid to buy a unit quantity of electricity at a particular location
and hour in the DA market with the obligation to sell the same amount at the
same location and hour in the RT market. The demand bid xt,k is cleared if the
bid price xt,k is higher than or equal to the DA price λt,k, i.e., xt,k ≥ λt,k. For the
accepted bid, the payoff is the difference between the RT and DA prices of that
option, i.e.,
(pit,k − λt,k)1{xt,k ≥ λt,k}
where 1{·} is the indicator function that is one if its argument is true and zero
otherwise.
Similarly, a virtual supply bid is an offer to sell electricity in the DA market
with the obligation to buy back in the RT market. The supply bid xt,k is cleared
if the bid price xt,k is lower than or equal to the market clearing price λt,k, i.e.,
xt,k ≤ λt,k. For the accepted bid, the payoff is given by
(λt,k − pit,k)1{xt,k ≤ λt,k}.
The payoff for the two types of bids can be expressed by a single expres-
sion through a simple translation. To this end, we assume that DA prices are
bounded with known upper/lower bounds, i.e. lλ < λt,k < uλ. Then, regardless
of the type of bids, the payoff obtained from option k on day t can be written as:
(pi′t,k − λ′t,k)1{x′t,k ≥ λ′t,k}
where, for a virtual demand bid, x′t,k = xt,k−lλ, λ′t,k = λt,k−lλ, and pi′t,k = pit,k−lλ;
and, for a virtual supply bid, x′t,k = uλ−xt,k, λ′t,k = uλ−λt,k, and pi′t,k = uλ−pit,k.
In this case, observe that x′t,k = 0 is equivalent to not bidding for option k on
day t.
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For notational convenience, hereafter we use λt,k, pit,k, and xt,k instead of λ′t,k,
pi′t,k, and x
′
t,k to represent the translated price and bid variables. The accumu-
lative return for a T-period trading horizon for a given bid xt,k sequence and
DA/RT prices, irrespective the type of bids, is given by
T∑
t=1
(pit,k − λt,k)1{xt,k ≥ λt,k}. (3.1)
Next, we study the problem of a virtual trader who considers to bid on K
options and aims to determine the optimal value of xt,k for each k ∈ {1, ..., K}
under a budget constraint. Note that a trader can submit multiple bids for the
same option, including demand and supply bids, simultaneously.
3.2 Problem Formulation
Let λt = [λt,1, ..., λt,K ]ᵀ and pit = [pit,1, ..., pit,K ]ᵀ be the vector of auction clearing
(day-ahead) and spot (real-time) prices at period (day) t, respectively. Simi-
larly, let xt = [xt,1, ..., xt,K ]ᵀ be the vector of bids for period t. At the end of
each period, the auction clearing and spot prices of all options are observed.
Therefore, before choosing the bid for period t, all the information the bidder
(virtual trader) has is a vector It−1 containing his observation and decision his-
tory {xi, λi, pii}t−1i=1.∗ Consequently, a bidding policy µ is defined as a sequence of
decision rules, i.e., µ = (µ0, µ1..., µT−1), such that, at period t − 1, µt−1 maps the
information history It−1 to the bid xt of period t.
∗In virtual trading, the bid for day t needs to be chosen before observing the full vector of
RT prices of day t− 1. However, in that case, It−1 = {xi, λi, pii}t−2i=1 can be used instead without
loss of generality.
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The objective is to determine a bidding policy µ that maximizes the expected
cumulative payoff over T periods subject to a budget constraint for each indi-
vidual period. From (3.1), the optimization problem can be written as
maximize
µ
E
(
T∑
t=1
(pit − λt)ᵀ1{xµt ≥ λt}
)
(3.2)
subject to ‖xµt ‖1 ≤ B, ∀t = 1, ..., T,
xµt ≥ 0, ∀t = 1, ..., T,
where xµt denotes the (translated) bid determined by policy µ, 1{xµt ≥ λt} is the
vector of indicator functions with the kth entry corresponding to 1{xµt,k ≥ λt,k},
andB is the auction budget∗ of the bidder. The expectation is taken with respect
to randomness in {pit, λt}Tt=1 and the policy µ.
The joint distribution of the auction clearing and spot prices is unknown to
the bidder. Hence, it is not possible to solve the optimization problem analyti-
cally. Instead, bidder uses his observation history to obtain the optimal bid.
3.3 Online Learning Approach to Virtual Trading
In this section, we develop an algorithmic bidding strategy aimed at maximiz-
ing expected payoff by allocating a fixed budget among K options without as-
suming the knowledge of underlying joint distribution of the auction clearing
and spot prices.
∗This budget provides an upper bound to DA market spending in the case of virtual demand
bids only and non-negative DA prices. However, it becomes artificial with the inclusion of
virtual supply bids. In the general setting, the budget constraint restricts the number of options
to bid and leads to the determination of bid values that provide the best payoff per unit of bid.
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An outline of our proposed approach is in order. Since the expected payoff
cannot be calculated analytically due to the unknown distribution, we consider
the maximization of the sample mean payoff, which is equivalent to an empir-
ical risk minimization (ERM) problem [79]. For fixed optimization horizon T ,
solving this ERM amounts to solving a multiple-choice knapsack problem [40],
which is NP hard. We propose a polynomial-time approximation algorithm, re-
ferred to as dynamic programming on discrete set (DPDS). We also extend this
algorithm to deal with the objective of optimizing a variant of mean-variance
measure.
3.3.1 An ERM Approach
Because past auction clearing and spot prices are observable, one can calculate
the (empirical) average payoff that could have been obtained up to the current
period by a fixed bid z ∈ F whereF = {z ∈ <K : z ≥ 0, ‖z‖1 ≤ B} is the feasible
set of bids. Let zk denote the fixed bid value for option k, i.e., the kth entry of
the fixed bid vector z. Specifically, the average payoff r¯t,k(zk) from option k with
fixed bid zk in t periods is
r¯t,k(zk) =
1
t
t∑
i=1
(pii,k − λi,k)1{zk ≥ λi,k}.
For example, at the end of first period, r¯t,k(zk) = (pi1,k − λ1,k)1{zk ≥ λ1,k} as
illustrated in Fig. 3.1a. For, t ≥ 2, this can be expressed recursively;
r¯t,k(zk) =

t−1
t
r¯t−1,k(zk) if zk < λt,k,
t−1
t
r¯t−1,k(zk) + 1t (pit,k − λt,k) if zk ≥ λt,k.
(3.3)
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Since each observation introduces a new breakpoint∗, and the value of average
payoff function is constant between two consecutive breakpoints, we observe
that r¯t,k(zk) is a piece-wise constant function with at most t breakpoints. Let the
vector of order statistics of the observed auction clearing prices {λi,k}ti=1 and
zero be λ(t,k) =
[
0, λ(1),k, ..., λ(t),k
]ᵀ. Let r(t,k) be the associated vector of aver-
age payoffs where r(t,k)j , the jth entry of the vector r
(t,k), is the average payoff
r¯t,k(λ
(t,k)
j ) for fixed bid λ
(t,k)
j , the jth entry of the vector λ
(t,k). Then, r¯t,k(zk) can
be expressed by the pair
(
λ(t,k), r(t,k)
)
as shown in Fig. 3.1b.
For a vector y, let ym:n = (ym, ym+1, ..., yn) denote the sequence of entries from
m to n. Initialize λ(0,k) = 0 and r(0,k) = 0 at the beginning of first period. Then,
at each period t ≥ 1, the pair (λ(t,k), r(t,k)) can be updated recursively as follows:
λ(t,k) =
[
λ
(t−1,k)
1:it,k
, λt,k, λ
(t−1,k)
it,k+1:t
]ᵀ
, (3.4)
and
r(t,k) =
[
t− 1
t
r
(t−1,k)
1:it,k
,
t− 1
t
r
(t−1,k)
it,k:t
+
1
t
(pit,k − λt,k)
]ᵀ
(3.5)
where it,k = maxi:λ(t−1,k)i <λt,k i.
Consequently, the overall average payoff function r¯t(z) is the sum of average
payoff functions of individual options, i.e.,
∑K
k=1 r¯t,k(zk). To determine the bid
for period t + 1, let’s consider the maximization of the overall average payoff
function, which corresponds to the ERM approach, i.e.,
max
xt+1∈F
r¯t(xt+1) = max
xt+1∈F
K∑
k=1
r¯t,k(xt+1,k). (3.6)
Due to the piece-wise constant structure, choosing xt+1,k = λ
(t,k)
i for some
i contributes the same amount to the overall payoff as choosing any xt+1,k ∈
∗Without loss of generality, we assume that the same auction clearing price value does not
occur multiple times.
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Figure 3.1: Example of a piece-wise constant average payoff function of option
k
[
λ
(t,k)
i , λ
(t,k)
i+1
)
. However, choosing xt+1,k = λ
(t,k)
i utilizes a smaller portion of
the budget. Hence, an optimal solution to (3.6) can be obtained by solving the
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following integer linear program:
maximize
{yk}Kk=1
K∑
k=1
(
r(t,k)
)ᵀ
yk
subject to
K∑
k=1
(
λ(t,k)
)ᵀ
yk ≤ B, (3.7)
‖yk‖1 ≤ 1, ∀k,
yk,i ∈ {0, 1}, ∀(k, i).
where the bid value xt+1,k =
(
λ(t,k)
)ᵀ
yk for node k.
Observe that (3.7) is a multiple choice knapsack problem (MCKP), a gener-
alization of the 0-1 knapsack. The MCKP problem in (3.7), unfortunately, is NP-
hard [40]. Had we a polynomial-time algorithm that finds an optimal solution
xt+1 ∈ F to (3.6), we would have obtained the solution of (3.7) in polynomial-
time by setting yk,i = 1 where i = maxi:λ(t,k)i ≤xt+1,k i for each k. By contradiction,
the ERM problem (3.6) is also NP-hard.
3.3.2 DPDS: A Polynomial-Time Online Learning Algorithm
We now derive a polynomial-time algorithm referred to as dynamic program-
ming on discrete set (DPDS). The idea behind DPDS is to discretize the feasible
set using intervals of equal length and optimize the average payoff on this new
discrete set via a dynamic program.
Let αt be an integer sequence increasing with t, andDt = {0, B/αt, 2B/αt, ..., B}
is a sequence of equally placed grid points in [0, B] with increasing density wtih
t as illustrated in Fig. 3.2. Then, the new discrete set is given as Ft = {z ∈ F :
zk ∈ Dt,∀k ∈ {1, ..., K}}. Our goal is to optimize r¯t(.) on the new set Ft rather
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Figure 3.2: Example of the discretization of the decision space for option k when
t = 4
than F , i.e.,
max
xt+1∈Ft
r¯t(xt+1) = max
xt+1∈Ft
K∑
k=1
r¯t,k(xt+1,k). (3.8)
Observe that, for fixed t, this can be written as a multistage decision problem
with K stages as follows: the state of stage k is the remaining budget bk ∈ Dt,
and the action (decision) of stage k is the bid value xt+1,k ∈ At,bk of option k
where At,bk = {zk ∈ Dt : zk ≤ bk}. In this case, Dt is the state space, At,bk the
action space of stage k, and r¯t,k(xt+1,k) the payoff (reward) of stage k for taking
action xt+1,k.
Now, we define the maximum payoff one can collect in state b over the re-
maining n stages as Vn(b). Then, the Bellman equation can be used to solve for
VK(B) which gives the optimal solution to (3.8). This type of dynamic pro-
gramming approach has been used to solve 0-1 Knapsack problems includ-
ing MCKP [32]. However, direct implementation of that approach results in
pseudo-polynomial computational complexity in the case of 0-1 Knapsack prob-
lems. The discretization of the feasible set with equal interval length reduces the
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computational complexity to polynomial time.
Assuming that V0(b) = 0 for any b, the Bellman equation can be written as
VK−k+1(b) = max
xt+1,k∈At,b
(r¯t,k(xt+1,k) + VK−k(b− xt+1,k)) , (3.9)
which can be solved via backward induction starting from k = K and proceed-
ing toward k = 1. For each k, VK−k+1(b) is calculated for all b ∈ Dt. Since
the computation of VK−k+1(b) requires at most αt + 1 comparison for any fixed
value of k ∈ {1, ..., K} and b ∈ Dt, it has a computational complexity on the
order of Kα2t given the average payoff values r¯t,k(xt+1,k) for all xt+1,k ∈ Dt
and k ∈ {1, ..., K}. For each k ∈ {1, ..., K}, computation of r¯t,k(xt+1,k) for all
xt+1,k ∈ Dt introduces an additional computational complexity of at most on the
order of twhich can be achieved by updating
(
λ(t,k), r(t,k)
)
from
(
λ(t−1,k), r(t−1,k)
)
recursively as given in (3.4) and (3.5). Hence, total computational complexity of
DPDS is O(K max(t, α2t )) at each period t.
3.3.3 Risk-Averse Learning
Maximizing expected profit is not necessarily a prudent strategy in algorithmic
bidding. Often the risk of a particular strategy needs to be taken into account. A
commonly used metric to measure the effectiveness of a strategy is the Sharpe
ratio, which is the ratio of the expected return and the standard deviation of the
return. In essence, this requires a trade-off between maximizing the expected
return and minimizing the variance.
In order to distribute the budget among the options with high payoff and
low variance, we extend DPDS algorithm to the optimization of sum of sam-
ple mean-variance of all options (a variant of the well known mean-variance
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strategy [60]). The sample mean-variance function for option k can be written
as
r¯
(ρ)
t,k (zk) = r¯t,k(zk)−
ρ
t− 1
t∑
i=1
((pii,k − λi,k)1{zk ≥ λi,k} − r¯t,k(zk))2
= r¯t,k(zk) + ρ
t
t− 1 r¯t,k(zk)
2
− ρ t
t− 1
(
1
t
t∑
i=1
(pii,k − λi,k)21{zk ≥ λi,k}
)
. (3.10)
In the last equality, observe that r¯(ρ)t,k (zk) is also a piece-wise constant function
with the same breakpoints as r¯t,k(zk). So, the extension of DPDS follows from
using r¯(ρ)t,k (zk) instead of r¯t,k(zk) while solving the Bellman equation. The value
of r¯(ρ)t,k (zk) can be obtained by additionaly updating the value of the last term
in (3.10). This update is similar to r¯t,k(zk) update given in (3.5). Please see the
algorithm pseudo-code given in Fig. 3.3 for the full implementation of DPDS.
3.4 Order Optimality of DPDS
We present a performance analysis of DPDS in this section. Our results are of
two types. First is to show that the expected payoff of DPDS converges to the
expected payoff of the globally optimal bidding strategy as the trading hori-
zon T → ∞. The second is to show that the rate of convergence of DPDS is
order-optimal up to a
√
log(T ) factor. This result shows that DPDS has a strong
convergence property over finite optimization horizons.
Observe that r¯(ρ)t,k (xt+1,k) = r¯t,k(xt+1,k) when ρ = 0. Here, we present our
analysis for the sum of mean-variance case (for any choice of ρ ≥ 0) that includes
the expected return (ρ = 0) as a special case.
65
1: Initialization: Set x1,k, λ(0,k), r(0,k), and v(0,k) to zero ∀ k ∈ {1, ..., K};
2: for t = 1 to T do
3: Bid xt;
4: At the end of period t, observe (λt, pit);
5: Update
(
λ(t,k), r(t,k)
) ∀ k ∈ {1, ..., K} using (3.4) and (3.5);
6: Update v(t,k) =
[
t−1
t
v
(t−1,k)
1:ik
, t−1
t
v
(t−1,k)
ik:t
+ 1
t
(pit,k − λt,k)2
]ᵀ
∀ k ∈ {1, ..., K}
where ik = maxi:λ(t−1,k)i <λt,k i;
7: Set V0(jB/αt) = 0 ∀ j ∈ {0, 1, ..., αt};
8: Set Vn(0) = 0 and wn(0) = 0 ∀ n ∈ {1, ..., K};
9: for k = K to 1 do
10: l = 2, d = 0, and j′ = αt;
11: for j = 1 to αt do
12: while d = 0 do
13: if λ(t,k)l > jB/αt then
14: r¯t,k (jB/αt) = r
(t,k)
l−1 + ρ
t
t−1 [(r
(t,k)
l−1 )
2 − v(t,k)l−1 ];
15: break;
16: else
17: if l = t+ 1 then
18: r¯t,k (jB/αt) = r
(t,k)
l + ρ
t
t−1 [(r
(t,k)
l )
2 − v(t,k)l ];
19: d = 1 and j′ = j;
20: break;
21: else
22: l = l + 1;
23: end if
24: end if
25: end while
26: VK−k+1(jB/αt) = VK−k(jB/αt);
27: wk(jB/αt) = 0;
28: for i = 1 to min{j, j′} do
29: if VK−k+1(jB/αt) < r¯t,k(iB/αt) + VK−k((j − i)B/αt) then
30: VK−k+1(jB/αt) = r¯t,k(iB/αt) + VK−k((j − i)B/αt);
31: wk(jB/αt) = iB/αt;
32: end if
33: end for
34: end for
35: end for
36: Br = B;
37: for k = 1 to K do
38: xt+1,k = wk(Br);
39: Br = Br − xt+1,k;
40: end for
41: end for
Figure 3.3: DPDS algorithm pseudo-code.
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3.4.1 Optimal Bidding Strategy under Known Distribution and
Regret
For performance analysis, it is necessary to make several assumptions. These
assumptions do not limit the implementation of the algorithm; they are neces-
sary to make the performance guarantee of DPDS precise. The assumptions,
(A1), (A2), and (A3) that are used for performance analysis are given below.
Assumption (A1). The auction clearing and spot prices (λt, pit) are drawn indepen-
dently∗ and identically† over time t from an unknown joint distribution f(λt, pit).
Assumption (A2). The payoff resulting from bidding on any option k ∈ {1, ..., K}
is a bounded random variable with support in [l, u] for any z ∈ F , i.e. l ≤ (pit,k −
λt,k)1{zk ≥ λt,k} ≤ u.
Define the expected payoff at period t of option k given the bid xt,k as
rk(xt,k) = E((pit,k − λt,k)1{xt,k ≥ λt,k}|xt,k),
and the variance of the payoff of option k given the bid xt,k as
vk(xt,k) = E
(
((pit,k − λt,k)1{xt,k ≥ λt,k} − rk(xt,k))2|xt,k
)
.
Then, the sum of mean-variance of all options will be given by
r(ρ)(xt) =
K∑
k=1
(rk(xt,k)− ρvk(xt,k)).
∗For a similar assumption in virtual trading literature, see Jha and Wolak [38], who showed
that one cannot reject the hypothesis that the autocorrelation matrices of DA-RT price differ-
ences beyond first leg are zero. Hence, the assumption is reasonable due to prices of day t − 1
being unobservable before bidding for day t in reality.
†This implies that the auction clearing price is independent of xt, which is reasonable for
any market where an individual has negligible impact on the market price.
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Assumption (A3). r(ρ)(.) is Lipschitz continuous on F with p-norm and Lipschitz
constant L.
Observe that if auction clearing and spot prices have a bounded support
and the distribution f(λt, pit) is uniformly continuous and uniformly bounded
on the union of that support and the feasible set F , then assumptions (A2) and
(A3) are satisfied.
For ρ ≥ 0, the problem of the bidder is to find a bidding policy µ such that
max
µ: xµt ∈ F ∀ t
E
(
T∑
t=1
r(ρ)(xµt )
)
, (3.11)
which is equivalent to (3.2) when ρ = 0. Due to (A1), optimal solution to (3.11)
under known distribution of (pit, λt) does not depend on t and is given by
x∗ = arg max
x∈F
r(ρ)(x).
Optimal solution x∗ may not be unique or it may not have a closed form.
The following example illustrates a case where there isn’t a closed form solu-
tion and shows that, even in the case of known distribution, the problem is a
combinatorial stochastic optimization, and it is not easy to calculate an optimal
solution.
Example. Let’s take ρ = 0. Let λt and pit be independent, λt,k be exponentially
distributed with mean λ¯k > 0, and the mean of pit,k be p¯ik > 0 for all k ∈ {1, .., K}.
Since not bidding for good k is optimal if p¯ik ≤ 0, we exclude the case p¯ik ≤ 0
without loss of generality. For this example, we can use the concavity of r(0)(x)
in the interval [0, p¯i], where p¯i = [p¯i1, ..., p¯iK ]ᵀ, to obtain the unique optimal solu-
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tion x∗, which is characterized by
x∗k =

p¯ik if
∑K
k=1 p¯ik ≤ B,
0 if
∑K
k=1 p¯ik > B and p¯ik/λ¯k < γ
∗,
zk satisfying (p¯ik − zk)e−zk/λ¯k/λ¯k = γ∗ if
∑K
k=1 p¯ik > B and p¯ik/λ¯k ≥ γ∗,
for all k ∈ {1, ..., K} where x∗k denotes the kth entry of x∗, and the Lagrange
multiplier γ∗ > 0 is chosen such that ‖x∗‖1 = B is satisfied. This solution takes
the form of a ”water-filling” strategy. More specifically, if the budget constraint
is not binding, then the optimal solution is to bid p¯ik for every good k. However,
in the case of a binding budget constraint, the optimal solution is determined by
the bid value at which the marginal expected payoff associated with each good
k is equal to min(γ∗, p¯ik/λ¯k), and this bid value cannot be expressed in closed
form.
Following the online machine learning literature, we measure the perfor-
mance of any bidding policy µ by its regret RµT (f), defined by the difference
between the total expected payoff of policy µ and that of the optimal solution
x∗, i.e.,
RµT (f) =
T∑
t=1
E
(
r(ρ)(x∗)− r(ρ)(xµt )
)
.
By definition, the regret is monotonically increasing for any policy µ and grows
linearly with T for the worst possible µ. Since we define optimality as maxi-
mizing the expected payoff, observe that a policy µ converges to the optimal
bidding strategy if the incremental regret E
(
r(ρ)(x∗)− r(ρ)(xµt )
)
goes to zero as
t→∞.
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3.4.2 Convergence and Regret Bound for DPDS
Theorem 8 below shows that the expected payoff of DPDS converges to the
expected payoff of the optimal solution x∗. More precisely, it characterizes the
rate of convergence and the regret growth rate of DPDS.
Theorem 8. Let xDPDSt+1 denote the bid of DPDS policy for period t + 1. Let DPDS
parameter choice αt = max(dαtγe, 2) with γ ≥ 1/2 and α > 0, and let (A1), (A2), and
(A3) hold. Then, for t ≥ 2,
E(r(ρ)(x∗)− r(ρ)(xDPDSt+1 )) ≤ C1
√
log t/t+ C2t
−1/2
and for T > 1,
RDPDST (f) ≤ C
√
T log T ,
where C = 2(C1 +C2) and C1 and C2 are positive constants which depend on the values
of K, L, p, B, u, l, ρ, α, and γ.
Proof. See the appendix.
The proof of Theorem 8 is derived by showing that the expected payoff of
x∗t+1 = arg maxx∈Ft r
(ρ)(x) converges to that of x∗ due to Lipschitz continuity, and
the expected payoff of xDPDSt+1 converges to that of x∗t+1 via the use of McDiarmid’s
inequality.
3.4.3 Lower Bound of Regret for any Bidding Policy
We now show that DPDS in fact achieves the slowest possible regret growth.
Specifically, Theorem 9 states that the regret of any policy is lower bounded by
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Ω(
√
T ). This result implies that the convergence rate of the expected payoff for
any policy cannot be faster than Ω(1/
√
t) because, otherwise, the regret growth
would have been slower than Ω(
√
T ). Hence, DPDS achieves the order-optimal
convergence as well as the slowest possible regret growth rate up to a logarith-
mic factor.
Theorem 9. Consider the case where K = 1, B = 1, ρ = 0. For any bidding policy µ,
there exists a distribution f satisfying assumptions (A1), (A2), and (A3) such that
RµT (f) ≥
1
16
√
5
√
T .
Proof. See the appendix.
The proof of Theorem 9 is derived by showing that, every time the bid is
cleared, an incremental regret greater than T−1/2/(4
√
5) is incurred under a dis-
tribution; otherwise, the same incremental regret is incurred under another dis-
tribution. However, to distinguish between these two distributions, one needs
Ω(T ) samples which results in a regret lower bound given in Theorem 9. The
bound is obtained by adapting a similar argument used by [8] in the context of
non-stochastic multi-armed bandit problem.
3.5 Empirical Study
3.5.1 Setup and Data
For the empirical study, we consider virtual bids on zonal nodes for two differ-
ent independent system operators: NYISO and PJM. We use historical DA and
71
RT price data from the beginning of 2006 until the end of 2016 of NYISO and
PJM zones. This data set is available for all 11 zones of NYISO and for 19 zones
of PJM. Since the price varies in time and location, there areN×24 different trad-
ing options every day where N = 11 for NYISO and N = 19 for PJM. The prices
are per unit (MWh) prices. We consider virtual demand and virtual supply bids
simultaneously for all options by using the model presented in Sec. 3.1.2. This
model requires the knowledge of an upper bound uλ and a lower bound lλ for
DA price. We choose uλ and lλ accordingly for each independent system op-
erator by looking at the range of the historical DA prices in that markets. We
set uλ = 1000 and lλ = 0 for NYISO; and uλ = 1050 and lλ = −30 for PJM.
Consequently, total number of options is K = 2×N × 24.
The DA market for day t closes early in the morning on day t − 1 for both
NYISO and PJM. Hence, all of the RT prices of day t − 1 cannot be observed
before the bid submission for day t. Therefore, the most recent observation used
for any algorithm was from day t− 2 to determine the bid for day t.
3.5.2 Benchmark Methods
We compare DPDS with three algorithms. One is UCBID-GR inspired by UCBID
[80]. On each day, UCBID-GR sorts all trading options according to their prof-
itabilities, i.e., their historical average DA-RT price spreads. Then, starting from
the most profitable option, it sets the bid for an option equal to its historical
average RT price∗ until there isn’t any sufficient budget left.
∗The bid is set to zero if historical average RT price is negative because bidding less than or
equal to zero implies not bidding on that option.
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The second algorithm is a variant of Kiefer-Wolfowitz stochastic approxi-
mation method, herein referred to as SA. SA approximates the gradient of the
payoff function by using the current observation and updates the bid of each k
as follows;
xt+1,k = xt,k + at
(pit−1,k − λt−1,k)(1{xt,k + ct ≥ λt−1,k} − 1{xt,k − ct,k ≥ λt−1,k})
ct
.
Then, xt+1 is projected to the feasible set F . The step size at and ct of SA were
determined by searching for values that provide relatively better payoff and
were set as 20000/(t− 1) and 2000/(t− 1)0.25, respectively.
The last algorithm is SVM-GR, which is inspired by the use of support vector
machines (SVM) by Tang et al. [75] to determine if a demand or a supply bid is
profitable for an option, i.e., if the price spread is positive or negative. Due to
possible correlation of a particular option’s price spread on any given day with
the price spreads of that and also of other options that are observed recently, for
day t, the input of SVM for each option is set as the price spreads of all options
from day t − 7 to day t − 2. To test SVM-GR algorithm at a particular year,
for each option, the data from the previous year is used to train SVM and to
determine the average profit, i.e., average price spread, and the bid level that
will be accepted with 95% confidence in the event that a demand or a supply
bid is profitable. For the test year, on each day, SVM-GR first determines if a
demand or a supply bid is profitable for each option. Then, SVM-GR sorts all
options according to their average profits, and, starting from the most profitable
option, it sets the bid of an option equal to the bid level with 95% confidence of
acceptance until there isn’t any sufficient budget left.
The DPDS algorithm was tested for ρ values of 0 and 0.002 to evaluate the
performance under a sum of mean-variance objective instance as well as for
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Figure 3.4: Cumulative profit trajectory from 2012 to 2016 in NYISO for
B=$250,000 after an initial training with 2011 data.
ρ = 0 (the risk-neutral objective). To differentiate between these two different
choices of ρ, let DPDS(ρ) denote the DPDS algorithm with associated ρ value.
The DPDS algorithm parameter αt was set to be t− 1.
3.5.3 Empirical Results
For each algorithm, the trajectory of cumulative profit that was obtained in NY-
ISO market with a daily budget of B=$250,000 from the beginning of 2012 un-
til the end of 2016 is given in Fig. 3.4. Since the data of 2011 was required to
train SVM-GR, other algorithms were also trained starting from the beginning
of 2011. First, we observed that DPDS significantly outperformed other algo-
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(a) Annual profit versus year
(b) Annual Sharpe ratio versus year
Figure 3.5: Annual performance in NYISO for B = $250, 000 (For each year, an
initial training with previous year’s data was performed.)
rithms in terms of Sharpe ratio∗, including the S&P 500 Sharpe ratio† of 2.10 for
∗Here, Sharpe ratio is calculated as
√
T (T − 1)r¯T /
√∑T
t=1(rt − r¯T )2 where r¯T = 1T
∑T
t=1 rt,
T is the number of trading days during the time period under consideration, and rt is the per-
centage return of day t, which is equal to the profit of day t for virtual trading with fixed daily
budget.
†To calculate this, S&P 500 adjusted closing price data for the time period under considera-
tion is used. This data is obtained from Yahoo finance.
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(a) Annual profit versus year
(b) Annual Sharpe ratio versus year
Figure 3.6: Annual performance in PJM for B = $250, 000 (For each year, an
initial training with previous year’s data was performed.)
the same period. See the legend of Fig. 3.4. This showed the significant value of
participating in virtual trading in terms of profitability and risk trade-off.
The cumulative profit of DPFS, as shown in Fig. 3.4, outperformed all other
algorithms with DPDS(0), which generated the highest profit. Comparing
DPDS(0) and DPDS(0.002) with the latter taking into account the variance of
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(a) 2016 profit versus budget level
(b) 2016 Sharpe ratio versus budget level
Figure 3.7: 2016 Performance in NYISO under different budget levels after an
initial training with 2014 and 2015 data
the return, we observed from Fig. 3.4 that DPDS(0.002) generated a smoother
return trajectory by avoiding more risky bids and generating less profit. We ob-
served that, even though other algorithms were profitable; the increase in their
cumulative profits was not consistent. Particularly, for UCBID-GR and SVM-
GR, most of their profit resulted from a jump occurred in January 2014 due to a
polar vortex [67], which didn’t affect SA because of SA’s incremental bid update
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via a local search.
To gain insights from the performance of these algorithms on a yearly ba-
sis, annual performances for 10 consecutive years in NYISO market and in PJM
market are provided in Fig. 3.5 and in Fig. 3.6, respectively. To evaluate the
performance of a given year, SVM-GR used the data from the previous year for
training. Hence, all other algorithms were trained for each year starting from
the beginning of the previous year. Fig. 3.5(a) illustrates the total profit that is
obtained each year in NYISO. We observed that DPDS outperformed all other
algorithms almost every year and consistently achieved a positive profit each
year for both ρ values; whereas, all other algorithms incurred losses frequently.
Due to the increasing trend in profits from 2009 to 2014, we couldn’t conclude
that there was a decrease in profits over the years as a result of price conver-
gence despite the decrease in the last two years. In NYISO, 2016 seemed to be
the worst year in terms of profitability in general. Annual Sharpe ratios of all al-
gorithms along with that of S&P 500 are illustrated in Fig. 3.5(b) for NYISO. We
observed that DPDS outperformed other algorithms and S&P 500 also in terms
of Sharpe ratio.
Similarly, total profit and Sharpe ratios that were achieved each year in the
PJM market are provided in Fig. 3.6(a) and Fig. 3.6(b), respectively. In PJM, we
observed that the trends in terms of both profit and Sharpe ratio were similar
to the ones observed in NYISO. In general, we observed that the profit margins
of all algorithms except SVM-GR were much higher in PJM compared with NY-
ISO. Similar to the case in NYISO, in PJM, DPDS achieved higher Sharpe ratios
than any other algorithm and than S&P 500. However, in PJM, the performance
gap between DPDS and others was much more significant. Furthermore, the
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Sharpe ratios were in general higher for all algorithms (except SVM-GR) in PJM
compared with NYISO counterparts. In PJM, especially DPDS exhibited very
high Sharpe ratios, i.e., between 2 and 9, which were consistently higher for
ρ = 0.002 (around 5 on average) compared with ρ = 0 (around 3.6 on average).
To illustrate how algorithms performed under different budget constraints,
we examined the NYISO market in 2016, the year with the lowest levels of profit
and Sharpe ratio (see Fig. 3.5). Total profit and Sharpe ratio for this period un-
der different budget levels are illustrated in Fig 3.7(a) and Fig 3.7(b), respec-
tively. Here, all algorithms were trained initially with the data from the pre-
vious two years rather than only previous year. When we increased the data
used for initial training to two years, we observed that algorithms performed
significantly better in terms of both profit and Sharpe ratio in general. We ob-
served that DPDS outperformed other algorithms at all budget levels, and profit
of DPDS(0) increased with increasing budget; whereas the profit of DPDS(0.002)
stayed in the same range without an increasing trend. This was reasonable be-
cause DPDS(0) optimized profit and should exhibit a profit increase for higher
budgets; whereas DPDS(0.002) optimized a linear combination of profit and
variance term, which did not indicate a profit increase. SVM-GR also illustrated
an increasing trend in profit, but this trend was much smaller compared with
the trend of DPDS(0). For both SA and UCBID-GR, big losses were observed
almost at all budget levels. In Fig. 3.7(b), we observed that DPDS achieved
higher Sharpe ratios than other algorithms for both ρ values, and the Sharpe ra-
tio of DPDS(0) stayed around the Sharpe ratio of S&P 500; whereas DPDS(0.002)
achieved higher Sharpe ratio than DPDS(0) consistently. So, even though the
profit levels of 2016 were not as high as the ones that were obtained in previous
years, there were bidding strategies that achieved better Sharpe ratio than that
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Figure 3.8: Regret with respect to
√
t when B = 13.845
of S&P 500.
3.6 Simulation Study
Here, we present a simulation example to illustrate the regret growth rate of
DPDS. We consider an example with K = 5. In this example, pit and λt are in-
dependent, λt is exponentially distributed with mean λ¯ = [4, 6, 8, 8, 4]ᵀ, and pit is
uniformly distributed with mean p¯i = [5, 8, 8, 9, 3]ᵀ and support in [p¯i − 1, p¯i + 1].
Previously, in Sec. 3.4.1, we stated the characterization of the optimal solution
for this example for ρ = 0. By using this characterization, we determined the op-
timal solution and the associated budgetB for a range of values of the Lagrange
multiplier γ∗ of the budget constraint. More specifically, for the values 0.1, 0.2,
0.3, and 0.4 of γ∗, the corresponding values ofB are 25.828, 20.870, 17.018, 13.845,
respectively. We evaluate the performance of algorithms for these four different
values of B.
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Figure 3.9: Regret with respect to
√
t when B = 17.018
Figure 3.10: Regret with respect to
√
t when B = 20.870
As a benchmark comparison we consider two different approaches. The
first one is based on a sliding window (SW) forecasting approach that calcu-
lates the average payoff function of each good every day from the prices of last
ten days only. Then, it determines the optimal solution maximizing the total
average payoff by solving the integer linear program given in (3.7). The second
one, referred to as SA, is a variant of Kiefer-Wolfowitz stochastic approximation
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Figure 3.11: Regret with respect to
√
t when B = 25.828
method as explained in Sec. 3.5.2. Recall that SA approximates the gradient of
the payoff function using the most recent observation and updates the bid of
each k. For this example, the update step of SA is calculated as
xt+1,k = xt,k + at
(pit,k − λt,k)(1{xt,k + ct ≥ λt,k} − 1{xt,k ≥ λt,k})
ct
.
Then, SA projects xt+1 to the feasible set F . To give a good result for B = 13.845,
step size at and ct were carefully chosen to be 5.5/t and 2.5/t1/4, respectively. We
set the DPDS algorithm parameter αt = t.
To calculate the average performance, 1000 Monte Carlo runs were used.
The regret performances for budgets 13.845, 17.018, 20.870 and 25.828 are given
in Fig. 3.8 through Fig. 3.11. In all cases, DPDS outperforms, and its order of
regret growth is actually better than
√
T . When the SA algorithm parameters are
tuned well, we observe that its performance may get close to DPDS as in Fig. 3.8.
However, when we increase the budget to 25.828 gradually, the performance of
SA deteriorates significantly. Also, as seen in all these figures, the regret of SW
is much higher than DPDS and SA because SW does not converge to the optimal
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solution due to fixed number of samples used in prediction.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSIONS
This thesis focuses on two online learning problems: the online learning and
optimization of Markov jump affine models, and the online learning of optimal
bidding strategy in repeated multi-commodity auctions. Here, we present our
concluding remarks separately for each problem.
4.1 Online Learning and Optimization of Markov Jump Affine
Models
In this part, we presented an online learning and optimization approach for
Markov jump affine models with unknown parameters for two different objec-
tives: (i) quadratic regulation and (ii) revenue maximization. For both objec-
tives, we established that the MSPSA achieves the optimal rate of regret growth
Θ(
√
T ). Compared to the classical time-invariant affine model, introducing a
Markov jump process to the system does not change the optimal rate of re-
gret growth for the revenue maximization objective. On the other hand, for
the quadratic regulation objective, our result indicates a significant change on
the optimal order of regret growth with the introduction of Markov jump dy-
namics. More specifically, the optimal regret growth rate changes from Θ(log T )
to Θ(
√
T ) due to the increase in the learning complexity. This result was not
clear previously because it does not follow from the lower bound proof of the
time-invariant setting of the problem.
The algorithms proposed in the literature for the time-invariant model are no
longer applicable for the extended model with Markov jump dynamics because
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the optimal input under the extended model is a function of the observed state
due to the Markov chain, and the direct implementations of existing algorithms
do not take into account the observed state of the Markov process.
To deal with the changing Markov process dynamics, we extend Spall’s
stochastic approximation method by introducing the idea of state tracking.
Even though the idea of state tracking may seem to be an intuitive extension,
it is not obvious if this type of extension of existing methods would actually
converge to the optimal input. For example, when the same idea of state track-
ing in MSPSA is applied to Robbins-Monro algorithm, which is used to solve
the quadratic regulation problem without Markov jump dynamics, we observe
that the solution converges to a suboptimal point resulting in a linear regret
growth. Yet, we show that it is possible to achieve the optimal regret growth
rate with MSPSA. We also show that this policy converges to the optimal input
both almost surely and in mean square. Furthermore, MSPSA has the flexibility
of gradient descent type algorithms in terms of applicability to more general
problems beyond the ones with linear model. However, more general classes of
problems are beyond the scope of this thesis and need to be treated separately.
Besides the contributions mentioned above, derivation of the lower bound
of regret provides some other interesting conclusions. One of these implica-
tions is that the regret increases from Θ(log T ) to Θ(
√
T ) even for the single state
case of the quadratic regulation problem when the system matrix becomes non-
invertible (but is still full-column). In other words, adding just one row to a
square and invertible matrix changes the regret order from Θ(log T ) to Θ(
√
T ).
This result is relevant in problems where the dimension of the observed output
is greater than that of the input.
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Another implication of the lower bound is an insight into the tradeoff be-
tween exploration and exploitation: the product of the cumulative estimation
error and the cumulative input error grows linearly with T for any policy. This
result indicates that if the goal is to optimize the estimation error only, then it is
possible to find a policy for which the estimation error grows slower than
√
T
in which case the input error has to grow faster than
√
T . In fact, if the MSPSA
algorithm parameter ct is set to be a constant rather than a decreasing sequence
of t, by following the upper bound proof of MSPSA, it can be shown that the
estimation error grows with log T whereas the input error and, hence, the regret
grow linearly with T .
The assumption of Markov process being observable and exogenous holds
for our motivating application: the dynamic pricing problem of an electricity re-
tailer with consumer demand that changes according to the exogenous weather
conditions. However, this assumption may become problematic for other ap-
plications. Therefore, it is also of interest to study the more general setting of
hidden Markov and endogenous Markov processes. Indeed, such problems are
receiving increasing attention. For example, reinforcement learning problem in
Markov decision processes (MDPs) gained significant popularity due to the suc-
cess of deep learning. However, the results on fundamental (theoretical) limits
of learning in this area, especially, for MDPs with continuous action spaces, are
extremely limited. Since our model is a special case of these more complex mod-
els including MDPs with continuous action space, the lower bound of regret in
our work constitutes also a lower bound for these problems. Hence, this result
provides a concrete initial step toward this general setting. Yet, it is not obvious
if MSPSA policy can be utilized to achieve convergence in these more general
settings. As a future work, it would be interesting to study if MSPSA policy can
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be extended to deal with these settings.
4.2 Online Learning of Optimal Bidding Strategy in Repeated
Multi-Commodity Auctions
We study the algorithmic bidding problem under budget constraint in repeated
multi-commodity auctions. Despite the fact that the objective function involved
is non-convex and the ERM problem is NP-hard, by combining general tech-
niques such as discretization approach and dynamic programming with ERM
approach, we derive a practical and efficient algorithm to the problem. We show
that the expected payoff of the proposed algorithm, DPDS, converges to that
of the optimal strategy by a rate no slower than
√
log t/t, which results in a
O(
√
T log T ) regret. By showing that the regret is lower bounded by Ω(
√
T ) for
any bidding strategy, we prove that DPDS is order optimal up to a
√
log T term.
For the motivating application of virtual trading in electricity markets, the
stochastic setting, studied here, is natural due to the electricity markets being
competitive, which implies that the existence of an adversary is unlikely. How-
ever, it is also of interest to study the adversarial setting to extend the results to
other applications. For example, the adversarial setting of our problem is a spe-
cial case of no-regret learning problem of Simultaneous Second Price Auctions
(SiSPA), studied in [28] and [31].
In particular, to deal with the adversarial setting, it is possible to use our
dynamic programming approach as the offline oracle for the Oracle-Based Gen-
eralized FTPL algorithm proposed in [31] if we fix the discretized action set over
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the whole time horizon. More specifically, let the interval length of discretiza-
tion beB/m, i.e., αt = m. Then, it is possible to show that a 1-admissible transla-
tion matrix with Kdlogme columns is implementable with complexity m. Con-
sequently, no-regret result of [31] holds with a regret bound of O(K
√
T logm)
if we measure the performance of the algorithm against the best action in hind-
sight in the discretized finite action set rather than in the original continuous
action set considered here. Unfortunately, as shown by Weed et al. [80], it is not
possible to achieve sublinear regret with a fixed discretization for the specific
problem considered here. Hence, it requires further work to see if this method
can be extended to obtain no-regret learning for the adversarial setting under
the original continuous action set.
The performance of the proposed algorithm is evaluated empirically by us-
ing a large historical data set that is obtained from NYISO and PJM energy
markets. Empirical results show that the proposed strategy consistently out-
performs benchmark methods and achieves significant profit. More significant,
perhaps, is that the proposed algorithm showed better Sharpe ratio against com-
petitors, including the S&P 500 index. Such historical data, obviously, do not
confirm with the assumption made for the regret result. This suggests a level of
robustness of the proposed algorithm.
There are several directions that the proposed approach can be generalized.
The algorithm presented here optimizes the bid values (willingness to pay) for
options but not the quantities (number of MWhs for virtual trading). Even
though the problem formulation allows optimization of multiple copies of the
same option as separate options, this is not efficient in terms of computational
complexity. An extension to include quantity as a decision variable should fur-
88
ther improve the performance. It would be also interesting to study other risk-
averse objectives. For example, including the bid values as well as bid quantities
as decision variables to the risk-constrained problem formulation in [56] can be
considered.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 2
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Let e˜i,ti = ‖xˆi,ti − x∗i ‖22. By MSPSA update step given in (2.9) and the fact that
projection onto Π maps a point closer to x∗i , we have,
e˜i,ti+1 ≤
∥∥∥∥∥xˆi,ti − ati
(
d+i,ti − d−i,ti
cti
)
∆¯ti − x∗i
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
= e˜i,ti − 2
ati
cti
(
d+i,ti − d−i,ti
)
(xˆi,ti − x∗i )ᵀ ∆¯ti +
a2ti
c2ti
(
d+i,ti − d−i,ti
)2
∆¯ᵀti∆¯ti . (A.1)
Our goal is to bound ei,ti+1 = E(e˜i,ti+1|i, ti) by simplifying (A.1). By (2.6), we
obtain,
E
(
d+i,ti − d−i,ti
∣∣i, ti, xˆi,ti ,∆ti) = 4cti∆ᵀti∑
j
pi,jA
ᵀ
j (Ajxˆi,ti + bj − y∗)
= 4cti∆
ᵀ
ti
(∑
j
pi,jA
ᵀ
jAj
)(
xˆi,ti − x∗i
)
where last equality is obtained using the FOC for x∗i . Let λmin,i =
λmin(
∑
j pi,jA
ᵀ
jAj). Using the independence of ∆ti,j’s, we get,
− 2
cti
E
((
d+i,ti − d−i,ti
)
(xˆi,ti − x∗i )ᵀ ∆¯ti
∣∣i, ti, xˆi,ti) = −8∑
j
pi,j ‖Aj (xˆi,ti − x∗i )‖22
≤ −8λmin,ie˜i,ti . (A.2)
Since Π is compact, ‖xˆi,ti ± cti∆ti‖ ≤ x¯ where constant x¯ = (maxx∈Π ‖x‖) +
γ′i
√
nξ1. For any j ∈ S, because bj and singular values of Aj are bounded,
‖Aj(xˆi,ti± cti∆ti)+ bj−y∗‖ ≤ C0 where constant C0 = σ¯x¯+ b¯+‖y∗‖. By Holder’s
inequality, we have E(‖wt‖22) ≤ mσ2w, E(‖wtwᵀtwt‖2) ≤ m2σ3w, and E(‖wt‖42) ≤
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m2σ4w. Then, after simplification, we obtain, E
(
(d±i,ti)
2|i, ti, xi,ti ,∆ti
) ≤ C1 where
C1 = C
4
0 +m
2σ4w + 6C
2
0mσ
2
w + 4C0m
2σ3w, and
E
(−2d+i,tid−i,ti∣∣i, ti, xˆi,ti ,∆ti) ≤ 8c2ti(∆ᵀti∑
j
pi,jA
ᵀ
j
(
Ajxˆi,ti + bj − y∗
))2
= 8c2ti
(
∆ᵀti
(∑
j
pi,jA
ᵀ
jAj
)(
xˆi,ti − x∗i
))2
,
where last equality is obtained using the FOC of x∗i . Consequently,
E
(d+i,ti − d−i,ti
cti
)2
∆¯ᵀti∆¯ti
∣∣∣∣∣i, ti, xˆi,ti
 ≤ C2e˜i,ti + C3c2ti , (A.3)
where C2 = 8 max{2, (1 + (n− 1)ξ21ξ2)}σ¯4 and C3 = 2C1nξ2.
Thus, by expressions (A.1), (A.2), and (A.3);
E(e˜i,ti+1|i, ti, xˆi,ti) ≤
(
1− ati8λmin,i + a2tiC2
)
e˜i,ti + a
2
ti
C3
c2ti
. (A.4)
Consequently,
ei,ti+1 ≤
(
1− ati8λmin,i + a2tiC2
)
ei,ti + a
2
ti
C3
c2ti
.
Using this result recursively and since ex ≥ 1 + x for all x ∈ <, we have,
ei,ti+1 ≤
( ti∏
j=1
(
1− 8ajλmin,i + a2jC2
))
ei,1
+
ti∑
j=1
( ti∏
l=j+1
(
1− 8alλmin,i + a2lC2
))
a2j
C3
c2j
≤ e
∑ti
j=1
(
−8ajλmin,i+a2jC2
)
ei,1 +
ti∑
j=1
e
∑ti
l=j+1
(
−8alλmin,i+a2lC2
)
a2j
C3
c2j
.
Since γi ≥ 1/(8λmin,i) and ei,1 ≤ (2 maxx∈Π ‖x‖2)2,
ei,ti+1 ≤ e− log(ti+1+Ni)+log(1+Ni)+2γ
2
i C2ei,1 +
ti∑
j=1
j +Ni
ti + 1 +Ni
e(1+Ni)
−1+2γ2i C2a2j
C3
c2j
≤ C
′
i
ti + 1 +Ni
+
C
′′
i
ti + 1 +Ni
ti∑
j=1
1√
j +Ni
≤ Ci√
ti + 1
,
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where C ′i = (1 + Ni) exp(2γ2iC2)4 maxx∈Π ‖x‖22, C ′′i = (γi/γ′i)2C3 exp((1 + Ni)−1 +
2γ2iC2)(1 + (max{0, N ′i −Ni})1/2), and Ci = max{C ′i , 2C ′′i }.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
In the proof of Lemma 1, for any state i ∈ S, we showed that the inequality (A.4)
holds where e˜i,ti = ‖xˆi,ti − x∗i ‖22. By Theorem 1 of Robbins and Siegmund [69],
we know that limti→∞ e˜i,ti <∞ exists and
∑∞
ti=1
8λmin,iati e˜i,ti <∞ almost surely
(a.s.). Since
∑∞
ti=1
8λmin,iati =∞, we obtain that
Pr
(
lim
ti→∞
e˜i,ti = 0
)
= 1.
Let 1i(st) be the indicator function. Given st−1 = i and ti, xMSPSAt is equal to
either xˆi,ti + cti∆ti or xˆi,ti − cti∆ti . Hence, ‖xMSPSAt − x∗i ‖22 ≤ 2e˜i,ti + 2(γ′i)2nξ21t−1/2i .
If state i is recurrent, Pr(limt→∞ ti <∞) = 0 because ti is greater or equal to half
of the number of times state i is occurred up to t. Therefore, for a recurrent state
i ∈ S,
Pr
(
lim
t→∞
1i(st−1)‖xMSPSAt − x∗i ‖22 = 0
)
= Pr
(
lim
t→∞
1i(st−1)‖xMSPSAt − x∗i ‖22 = 0| lim
t→∞
ti =∞
)
≥ Pr
(
lim
t→∞
(2e˜i,ti + 2(γ
′
i)
2nξ21t
−1/2
i ) = 0| lim
t→∞
ti =∞
)
= Pr
(
lim
ti→∞
e˜i,ti = 0
)
= 1.
So, for a recurrent state i and for any  > 0, we have,
lim
t′→∞
Pr
(
1i(st−1)‖xMSPSAt − x∗i ‖22 >  for some t ≥ t′
)
= 0. (A.5)
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If a state i ∈ S is transient, then for any  > 0, we have,
lim
t′→∞
Pr
(
1i(st−1)‖xMSPSAt − x∗i ‖22 >  for some t ≥ t′
)
≤ lim
t′→∞
Pr (st−1 = i for some t ≥ t′)
= 0, (A.6)
where last equality is due to Borel-Cantelli lemma and the fact that
∑∞
t=0 Pr(st =
i) <∞ for a trasient state i.
By definition, expression (2.11) holds, if and only if, for every  > 0,
limt′→∞ Pr(‖xMSPSAt − x∗st−1‖22 >  for some t ≥ t′) = 0. Any state i ∈ S is ei-
ther recurrent or transient. Hence, by (A.5) and (A.6), we obtain that, for any
 > 0,
lim
t→∞
Pr
(‖xMSPSAt − x∗st−1‖22 >  for some t ≥ t′)
≤ lim
t→∞
K∑
i=1
Pr
(
1i(st−1)‖xMSPSAt − x∗i ‖22 >  for some t ≥ t′
)
= 0.
Since (2.11) holds and ‖xMSPSAT − x∗i ‖22 ≤ C0 where C0 = (2 maxx∈Π ‖x‖ +
γ′i
√
nξ1)
2, by Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem,
lim
t→∞
E
(‖xMSPSAt − x∗st−1‖22) = 0.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Let the transition probability from any state to any other state be 1/K. Without
loss of generality, take y∗ = 0. Let wt be i.i.d. with distribution N(0m, σ2wIm)
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which is independent of the state.
Because additional observations can’t increase the growth rate of regret for
an optimal policy, we assume that the decision maker receives the observation
values corresponding to the input xµt from all other states that didn’t occur at
time t as additional observations at time t. Hence, at each t, the decision maker
gets observations from the affine functions of all states for input xµt . Let’s define
A, b, and wt as
A =

A1
...
AK
 b =

b1
...
bK
 wt =

w
(1)
t
...
w
(K)
t

where w(i)t denotes the system noise of observation from state i. Now, for any
policy µ, we can express the observation vector at t as
yµt = Ax
µ
t + b+ wt.
Observe that FOC for the optimal input x∗st−1 at time t obtained from mini-
mizing (2.6) is the same for any state st−1 ∈ S for our fixed choice of P . Hence,
we drop the dependence on the previous state st−1 along with P and denote it as
x∗(θ), i.e., x∗st−1 = x
∗(θ), to express the dependence on θ. With the new notation,
FOC can be expressed as
ν = Aᵀ(Ax∗(θ) + b) = 0.
Consequently, the optimal price given in (2.7) becomes
x∗(θ) = −(AᵀA)−1Aᵀb.
Let’s express θk as θk = [bk,1, ak,1, ..., bk,m, ak,m]ᵀ where bk,i is the ith entry of bk
and ak,i is the ith row vector of Ak. We fix a compact rectangle Θ ⊂ <K×m×(n+1)
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such that, for any θ ∈ Θ, x∗(θ) is contained in Π and Ak is full column rank
for all k ∈ S. ∗ Since P and {fi}Ki=1 are already fixed, our goal is to obtain the
performance of the worst-case system parameter θ that is chosen from the set Θ.
Applying implicit function theorem on ν gives
∂x∗(θ)
∂θ
= −
(
∂ν
∂x∗(θ)
)−1
∂ν
∂θ
= − (AᵀA)−1 ∂ν
∂θ
, (A.7)
and by calculus, we have,
(
∂ν
∂θ
)ᵀ
= (Ax∗(θ) + b)⊗
0ᵀn
In
+ A⊗
 1
x∗(θ)
 . (A.8)
Let M = Km. Density of the output vector up to time t given the parameter
vector θ and input vector X t can be written as
g(Y t|X t, θ) =
t∏
i=1
exp (−‖yµi − b− Axµi ‖22/(2σ2w))
(2piσ2w)
M/2
.
By writing the joint distribution as a product of conditionals and by the con-
ditional independence of the input for any policy µ from the parameter θ given
the information history vector It−1, we get,
∂ log g(Y t, X t|θ)
∂θ
=
∂ log g(Y t|X t, θ)
∂θ
=
1
σ2w
t∑
i=1
wi ⊗
 1
xµi
 .
By using the mixed product property (A ⊗ B)(C ⊗D) = AC ⊗ BD and the
∗The existence of Θ can be shown by the continuity of x∗(θ) on a compact rectangle Θ′ which
satisfies Ak to be full column rank for all k ∈ S and for any θ ∈ Θ′, and contains a fixed point θ′
in its interior for which x∗(θ′) is in the interior of Π. The existance of Θ′ can be shown by using
the continuity of the determinant of AᵀkAk for each k ∈ S at the fixed point θ′.
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independence of wi, we obtain the fisher information for g as
Iµt (θ) = E
(
∂ log g(Y t|X t, θ)
∂θ
∂ log g(Y t|X t, θ)
∂θ
ᵀ∣∣∣∣X t, θ)
=
1
σ2w
IM ⊗
 t∑
i=1
 1
xµi
[1, (xµi )ᵀ]
 . (A.9)
Now, we choose a prior distribution λ as an absolutely continuous density
on Θ taking positive values in the interior of Θ and zero on its boundary. We
choose A and b to be independently distributed with distributions λA and λb,
respectively, so that λ = λAλb. Take C(θ) = bᵀ ⊗
[
−x∗(θ), In
]
. Now, we use the
multivariate van Trees inequality [35] in a similar way in [42]. This inequality
can be expressed as
E
(‖xˆµt − x∗(θ)‖22) ≥
(
E
(
tr
(
C(θ)∂x
∗(θ)
∂θ
ᵀ)))2
E
(
tr
(
C(θ)Iµt−1(θ)C(θ)ᵀ
))
+ I˜(λ)
(A.10)
where the expectation operators are also taken over the prior distribution λ and
I˜(λ) is some constant given λ, which can be seen as the Fisher information for
the distribution λ.
By (A.9), we have,
tr
(
C(θ)Iµt−1(θ)C(θ)
ᵀ) = bᵀb
σ2w
t−1∑
i=1
‖xµi − x∗(θ)‖22
≤ c0
t−1∑
i=1
‖xµi − x∗(θ)‖22 (A.11)
where c0 = (Kb¯2)/σ2w.
Let’s define P = IM−A(AᵀA)−1Aᵀ. SinceAᵀA is symmetric positive definite,
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by (A.7) and (A.8), we obtain
tr
(
C(θ)
∂x∗(θ)
∂θ
ᵀ)
= tr
(
−C(θ)∂ν
∂θ
ᵀ
(AᵀA)−1
)
= −bᵀ (Ax∗(θ) + b) tr ((AᵀA)−1)
= −bᵀPb tr ((AᵀA)−1) .
By singular value decomposition (SVD) of A, observe that P =
UD(0ᵀn,1
ᵀ
M−n)U
ᵀ where U ∈ <M×M is an orthogonal matrix, and D(d1, ..., dM)
denotes a diagonal matrix with diagonal entries d1, ..., dM . Hence, P is symmet-
ric positive semidefinite. Also observe that tr((AᵀA)−1) ≥ n/(Kσ¯2). Then, we
can bound the numerator term,(
E
(
tr
(
C(θ)
∂x∗(θ)
∂θ
ᵀ)))2
≥ n
2
K2σ¯4
(E (bᵀPb))2 . (A.12)
Observe that P¯ = E(P ) is symmetric positive semidefinite and nonzero for
K > 1 (or K = 1 and m > n) since tr(P¯ ) = E(tr(P )) = Km − n. Hence,
there exists some direction z ∈ <M such that zᵀP¯ z > 0, and, consequently,
there exists some distribution λb such that E(b)ᵀP¯E(b) > 0. More specifically,
if E(b)ᵀP¯E(b) = 0 for some choice of λb, we can change that choice of λb to
shift the mean of b slightly in the direction of z, and have E(b)ᵀP¯E(b) > 0. By
independence of b and P ,
E (bᵀPb) = E(b)ᵀP¯E(b) + E ((b− E(b))ᵀ P (b− E(b)))
≥ E(b)ᵀP¯E(b). (A.13)
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Hence, by expressions (A.10), (A.11), (A.12), and (A.13);
T∑
t=2
E
(‖xˆµt − x∗(θ)‖22) ≥ T∑
t=2
c1
E(
∑t−1
i=1 ‖xµi − x∗(θ)‖22) + c2
≥
T∑
t=2
c1
E(
∑T
i=1 ‖xµi − x∗(θ)‖22) + c2
,
(A.14)
where c1 = n2(E(b)ᵀP¯E(b))2/(K2σ¯4c0) and c2 = I˜(λ)/c0.
Since E¯µT ≥ E(
∑T
i=1 ‖xµi − x∗(θ)‖22), by (A.14), we have,
EˆµT ≥
c1(T − 1)
E¯µT + c2
≥ c1(T − 1)
(1 + c2/E¯µ1 )E¯µT
.
Let x∗k(θ) denote the kth entry of x
∗(θ), and, by extreme value theorem,
uk = supθ∈Θ x
∗
k(θ) and lk = infθ∈Θ x
∗
k(θ) are attained. Since x
∗(θ) is not
a constant over Θ (otherwise ∂x∗(θ)/∂θ would be zero for all θ ∈ Θ, and
left hand side of (A.12) would be zero for any λ which is a contradiction),
maxk∈{1,...,n}(uk − lk) > 0. For any policy µ, E¯µ1 = supθ∈Θ E(‖xµ1 − x∗(θ)‖22|θ) ≥
maxk∈{1,...,n}((uk − lk)/2)2 > 0. Hence, we have, EˆµT ≥ (CT )/E¯µT where C =
c1/2/
(
1 + (4c2/maxk∈{1,...,n}(uk − lk)2)
)
.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 2
We will follow the steps in Lemma 1 and simplify inequality (A.1). By (2.16), we
obtain,
E
(
d+i,ti − d−i,ti
∣∣i, ti, xˆi,ti ,∆ti) = −2cti∆ᵀti∑
j
pi,j
((
Aj + A
ᵀ
j
)
xˆi,ti + bj
)
= −2cti∆ᵀti
(∑
j
pi,j
(
Aj + A
ᵀ
j
) )(
xˆi,ti − x∗i
)
,
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where last equality is obtained using the FOC for x∗i . Let λmin,i =
λmin(−
∑
j pi,j(Aj + A
ᵀ
j )/2). Using the independence of ∆ti,j’s, we obtain,
− 2
cti
E
((
d+i,ti − d−i,ti
)
(xˆi,ti − x∗i )ᵀ ∆¯ti
∣∣i, ti, xˆi,ti)
= 4
(
xˆi,ti − x∗i
)ᵀ(∑
j
pi,j(Aj + A
ᵀ
j )
)(
xˆi,ti − x∗i
)
≤ −8λmin,ie˜i,ti .
As in Lemma 1, ‖xˆi,ti ± cti∆ti‖ ≤ x¯. Hence, for any j ∈ S, (xˆi,ti ±
cti∆ti)
ᵀ(Aj(xˆi,ti ± cti∆ti) + bj) ≤ σ¯x¯2 + b¯x¯. Since E(‖wt‖22) ≤ nσ2w,
E
(
(d±i,ti)
2|i, ti, xˆi,ti ,∆ti
) ≤ C1 where constant C1 = (σ¯x¯2 + b¯x¯)2 + nσ2wx¯2. Con-
sequently,
E
((
d+i,ti − d−i,ti
)2 ∣∣∣i, ti, xˆi,ti ,∆ti) ≤ 2c2ti(∆ᵀti(∑
j
pi,j
(
Aj + A
ᵀ
j
) )(
xˆi,ti−x∗i
))2
+2C1,
and thus, we obtain (A.3) where C2 = 8 max{2, (1 + (n − 1)ξ21ξ2)}σ¯2 and
C3 = 2C1nξ2. Therefore, (A.4) holds and the rest of the proof is the same as
in Lemma 1.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 7
The inequality given in (2.19) is used to obtain (2.20) and (2.21) as in Theorem 4.
The proof of inequality (2.19) follows the proof of Theorem 3 with some slight
modifications to bound the numerator term of the van Trees inequality due to
revenue maximization objective.
The FOC for x∗(θ) becomes ν =
∑
j((A
ᵀ
j +Aj)x
∗(θ) + bj) = 0 and the optimal
price x∗(θ) = (
∑
j −(Aᵀj +Aj))−1(
∑
j bj). For this problem, the compact rectangle
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Θ is such that, for any θ ∈ Θ, x∗(θ) is contained in Π and Ak is negative definite
for all k ∈ S.∗ The implicit function theorem on ν gives
∂x∗(θ)
∂θ
= −
(∑
j
(
Aᵀj + Aj
))−1∂ν
∂θ
where (
∂ν
∂θ
)ᵀ
= 1K ⊗
x∗(θ)⊗
0ᵀn
In
+ In ⊗
 1
x∗(θ)

 .
We take λb such that E(
∑
j bj) 6= 0. Consequently, the numerator term of the
van Trees Inequality can be bounded as
E
(
tr
(
C(θ)
∂x∗(θ)
∂θ
ᵀ))
= E
((∑
j
bj
)ᵀ
x∗(θ) tr
(∑
j
− (Aᵀj + Aj) )−1)
≥
nE
((∑
j bj
)ᵀ (∑
j bj
))
(2Kσ¯)2
≥
nE
(∑
j bj
)ᵀ
E
(∑
j bj
)
(2Kσ¯)2
> 0.
∗The existence of such a set can shown by the same argument as in Theorem 3 by using the
continuity of the maximum eigenvalue of Ak rather than the determinant.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 3
B.1 Proof of Theorem 8
Recall that x∗ = arg maxx∈F r(ρ)(x) and let x∗t+1 = arg maxx∈Ft r(ρ)(x). Hence, for
any x′ ∈ Ft,
r(ρ)(x∗)− r(ρ)(x∗t+1) ≤ r(ρ)(x∗)− r(ρ)(x′).
Let x∗k and x
′
k denote the kth entry of x
∗ and x′, respectively. We take x′k =
bx∗k/(B/αt)c(B/αt) for all k ∈ {1, ..., K}, where bx∗k/(B/αt)c denotes the largest
integer smaller or equal to x∗k/(B/αt), so that x
′ ∈ Ft and |x′k − x∗k| ≤ B/αt for
all k ∈ {1, ..., K}. Then, due to Lipschitz continuity of r(ρ)(.) on F with p-norm
and constant L,
r(ρ)(x∗)− r(ρ)(x∗t+1) ≤ LK1/pB/αt. (B.1)
Since the payoff obtained at each period t from bidding on a node k ∈
{1, ..., K} is in [l, u] and r(ρ)(.) is Lipschitz, r(ρ)(x∗t+1)− r(ρ)(x) ≤ c1 for any x ∈ Ft
where c1 = min
(
c2, LK
1/pB
)
and c2 = K ((u− l) + ρ(u− l)2). Then, for any
δt > 0,
r(ρ)(x∗t+1)− r(ρ)(xDPDSt+1 ) =
∑
x∈Ft
(
r(ρ)(x∗t+1)− r(ρ)(x)
)
1
{
xDPDSt+1 = x
}
≤ δt
∑
x∈Ft:r(ρ)(x∗t+1)−r(ρ)(x)≤δt
1
{
xDPDSt+1 = x
}
+ c1
∑
x∈Ft:r(ρ)(x∗t+1)−r(ρ)(x)>δt
1
{
xDPDSt+1 = x
}
≤ δt + c1
∑
x∈Ft:r(ρ)(x∗t+1)−r(ρ)(x)>δt
1
{
xDPDSt+1 = x
}
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where the last inequality is obtained by the fact that at most one of the indicator
functions can be equal to one due to the events being disjoint.
Since DPDS chooses xt+1 ∈ Ft that maximizes r¯(ρ)t (xt+1) =
∑K
k=1 r¯
(ρ)
t,k (xt+1,k),
r¯
(ρ)
t (x) ≥ r¯(ρ)t (x∗t+1) has to hold for any x ∈ Ft if xDPDSt+1 = x. Hence, we can upper
bound the last inequality obtained to get
r(ρ)(x∗t+1)− r(ρ)(xDPDSt+1 ) ≤ δt + c1
∑
x∈Ft:r(ρ)(x∗t+1)−r(ρ)(x)>δt
1{r¯(ρ)t (x) ≥ r¯(ρ)t (x∗t+1)}.
In order for r¯(ρ)t (x) ≥ r¯(ρ)t (x∗t+1) to hold for any x ∈ Ft satisfying r(ρ)(x∗t+1) −
r(ρ)(x) > δt, observe that the event
E1 =
{
r¯
(ρ)
t (x
∗
t+1) + δt/2 ≤ r(ρ)(x∗t+1)
}
holds and/or the event
E2 =
{
r(ρ)(x) + δt/2 ≤ r¯(ρ)t (x)
}
holds. Consequently,
E
(
r(ρ)(x∗t+1)− r(ρ)(xDPDSt+1 )
) ≤ δt + c1 ∑
x∈Ft:r(ρ)(x∗t+1)−r(ρ)(x)>δt
Pr (E1 ∪ E2) .
Also, observe that, for any fixed x ∈ F , E
(
r¯
(ρ)
t (x)
∣∣∣x) = r(ρ)(x). So, we can
use McDiarmid’s inequality [62] to upper bound both Pr(E1) and Pr(E2) if we
show that r¯(ρ)t (x) for fixed x ∈ Ft satisfies the bounded differences condition
as a function of {(λi, pii)}ti=1 ∈ Πt where Π denotes the support of the random
variable (λi, pii).
Let xk denote the kth entry of x. Define r¯
(−j)
t (x) =
∑K
k=1 r¯
(−j)
t,k (xk) where
r¯
(−j)
t,k (xk) =
1
t− 1
∑
i:i 6=j,1≤i≤t
(pii,k − λi,k)1{xk ≥ λi,k},
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and define v¯(−j)t (x) =
∑K
k=1 v¯
(−j)
t,k (xk) where
v¯
(−j)
t,k (xk) =
1
t− 1
∑
i:i 6=j,1≤i≤t
(
(pii,k − λi,k)1{xk ≥ λi,k} − r¯(−j)t,k (xk)
)2
.
Then, for any j ∈ {1, ..., t}, we can express r¯(ρ)t (x) as follows:
r¯
(ρ)
t (x) = h
(−j)
t (x) +
1
t
K∑
k=1
(pij,k − λj,k)1{xk ≥ λj,k}
− ρ
t
K∑
k=1
(
(pij,k − λj,k)1{xk ≥ λj,k} − r¯(−j)t,k (xk)
)2
where
h
(−j)
t (x) =
t− 1
t
r¯
(−j)
t (x)− ρv¯(−j)t (x)
doesn’t depend on (λj, pij). We also define r¯
(ρ,j′)
t (x) as the average payoff func-
tion that would result from observing (λj′ , pij′) instead of (λj, pij) at period j.
Consequently,
r¯
(ρ,j′)
t (x) = h
(−j)
t (x) +
1
t
K∑
k=1
(pij′,k − λj′,k)1{xk ≥ λj′,k}
− ρ
t
K∑
k=1
(
(pij′,k − λj′,k)1{xk ≥ λj′,k} − r¯(−j)t,k (xk)
)2
.
Recall that, for any (λi, pii) ∈ Π, x ∈ F and k ∈ {1, .., K}, l ≤
(pii,k − λi,k)1{xk ≥ λi,k} ≤ u. Therefore, for any j ∈ {1, ..., t} and x ∈
F , r¯(ρ)t (x), r¯(ρ,j
′)
t (x) ∈
[
h
(−j)
t (x) +K(l − ρ(u− l)2)/t, h(−j)t (x) +Ku/t
]
for any
{(λi, pii)}ti=1 , (λj′ , pij′) ∈ Πt+1. Hence, for any x ∈ F and j ∈ {1, ..., t},
sup
{(λi,pii)}ti=1,(λj′ ,pij′ )∈Πt+1
∣∣∣r¯(ρ)t (x)− r¯(ρ,j′)t (x)∣∣∣ ≤ c2t .
Since bounded differences condition holds, by McDiarmid’s inequality, both
Pr(E1) and Pr(E2) are upper bounded by exp (−tδ2t / (2c22)). Using the fact that
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the cardinality of the set
{
x ∈ Ft : r(ρ)(x∗t+1)− r(ρ)(x) > δt
}
is upper bounded by
αKt +K ≤ 2αKt for αt ≥ 2 and Pr(E1 ∪ E2) ≤ Pr(E1) + Pr(E2), we get
E
(
r(ρ)(x∗t+1)− r(ρ)(xDPDSt+1 )
) ≤ δt + 4c1αKt exp(− tδ2t2c22
)
. (B.2)
By setting δt = c2
√
2(γ + 1)K + 1
√
log t/t and αt = max(dαtγe, 2) with γ ≥
1/2 and α > 0, from (B.1) and (B.2), we obtain
E(r(ρ)(x∗)− r(ρ)(xDPDSt+1 )) = E(r(ρ)(x∗)− r(ρ)(x∗t+1)) + E(r(ρ)(x∗t+1)− r(ρ)(xDPDSt+1 ))
≤ LK1/pB/αt + C1
√
log t/t+ 4c1α
K
t t
−(γ+1)K−1/2
≤ (LK1/pB/α + 4c1 max (t−K/2, ((α + 1)/t)K)) t−1/2
+ C1
√
log t/t
≤ C1
√
log t/t+ C2t
−1/2,
where C1 = c2
√
2(γ + 1)K + 1 and C2 = LK1/pB/α + 4c1 max(1, αK).
For any T ≥ 2, ∑T−1t=1 1/√t ≤ 2√T − 1 − 1 and ∑T−1t=1 √log t/t ≤
2
√
(T − 1) log(T − 1). Hence, for T > 2,
T−1∑
t=2
E
(
r(ρ)(x∗)− r(ρ)(xDPDSt+1 )
) ≤ C1 T−1∑
t=1
√
log t
t
+ C2
T−1∑
t=1
1√
t
≤ 2C1
√
(T − 1) log(T − 1) + C2
(
2
√
T − 1− 1
)
.
Since E
(
r(ρ)(x∗)− r(ρ)(xDPDSt )
) ≤ c1, for any T ≥ 1,
RDPDST (f) ≤ 2C1
√
T log T + 2C2
√
T
and for any T > 1,
RDPDST (f) ≤ 2(C1 + C2)
√
T log T .
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B.2 Proof of Theorem 9
Let λt and pit be independent random variables with distributions
fλ(λt) = 
−11{(1− )/2 ≤ λt ≤ (1 + )/2}
and fpi(pit) = Bernoulli(p¯i), respectively. Let f(λt, pit) = fλ(λt)fpi(pit) and  =
T−1/2/2
√
5.
Fix any policy µ. Since λt and pit are independent,
r(0)(x) = E((p¯i − λt)1{x ≥ λt}|x)
and
r(0)(x∗)− r(0)(xµt ) = E((p¯i − λt)(1{x∗ ≥ λt} − 1{xµt ≥ λt})|xµt , x∗) (B.3)
Let f0, f1, f2 denote the distribution of {λt, pit}Tt=1 and policy µ under the
choice of p¯i = 1/2, p¯i = 1/2− , and p¯i = 1/2 + , respectively. Also, let Ei(.) and
RµT (fi) denote the expectation with respect to the distribution fi and the regret
of policy µ under distribution fi, respectively.
Under distribution f1, observe that p¯i − λt ≤ −/2 for any value of λt .
Therefore, optimal solution under known distribution x∗ ∈ [0, (1− )/2] so that
1{x∗ ≥ λt} = 0. Then, by (B.3), the regret can be expressed as
RµT (f1) = E1
(
T∑
t=1
−(p¯i − λt)1{xµt ≥ λt}
)
≥ 
2
E1
(
T∑
t=1
1{xµt ≥ λt}
)
.
Similarly, under distribution f2, observe that p¯i−λt ≥ /2 for any value of λt.
Therefore, optimal solution under known distribution x∗ ∈ [(1 + )/2, 1] so that
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1{x∗ ≥ λt} = 1. Then, by (B.3), the regret becomes
RµT (f2) = E2
(
T∑
t=1
(p¯i − λt)1{xµt < λt}
)
≥ 
2
E2
(
T∑
t=1
1{xµt < λt}
)
.
For any non-negative bounded function h defined on information history
IT = {xt, λt, pit}Tt=1 such that 0 ≤ h(IT ) ≤ M for some M ≥ 0 and for any
distributions p and q, the difference between the expected value of h under the
distributions p and q is bounded by a function of the KL-divergence between
these distributions as follows:
Eq(h(IT ))− Ep(h(IT )) ≤
∫
q(IT )>p(IT )
h(IT )(q(IT )− p(IT ))dIT
≤M
∫
q(IT )>p(IT )
q(IT )− p(IT )dIT
= M
1
2
∫
|q(IT )− p(IT )|dIT
≤M
√
KL(q||p)/2. (B.4)
where KL(q||p) = ∫ q(IT ) log(q(IT )/p(IT ))dIT is the KL-divergence between q
and p and the last inequality is due to Pinsker’s inequality [78], i.e., V (q, p) ≤√
KL(q||p)/2 where V (q, p) = ∫ |q(IT ) − p(IT )|dIT/2 is the variational distance
between q and p. The bound given in (B.4) is inspired by a similar bound ob-
tained by [8] in the proof of Lemma A.1 for the case of discrete distribution in
the context of non-stochastic multi-armed bandit problem.
Now, since
∑T
t=1 1{xµt ≥ λt} ≤ T and
∑T
t=1 1{xµt < λt} ≤ T , we use (B.4) to
obtain
RµT (f1) ≥

2
E0
(
T∑
t=1
1{xµt ≥ λt}
)
− 
2
T
√
KL(f0||f1)/2,
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and
RµT (f2) ≥

2
E0
(
T∑
t=1
1{xµt < λt}
)
− 
2
T
√
KL(f0||f2)/2.
Consequently,
max
i∈{1,2}
RµT (fi) ≥
1
2
(RµT (f1) +RµT (f2))
≥ 
4
(
T − T
√
KL(f0||f1)/2− T
√
KL(f0||f2)/2
)
. (B.5)
For any i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, we can express the distribution of observations in terms of
conditional distributions as follows;
fi(IT ) =
T∏
t=1
fi(pit, λt|xµt , It−1)fi(xµt |It−1)
=
T∏
t=1
fi(pit)fλ(λt)f(x
µ
t |It−1),
where the second equality is due to the independence of λt and pit from the past
observations It−1, the bid x
µ
t , and from each other. Also, the distribution of x
µ
t
given It−1 does not depend on i. Consequently, for i ∈ {1, 2},
KL(f0||fi) =
∫
f0(IT ) log
(
T∏
t=1
f0(pit)
fi(pit)
)
dIT
=
T∑
t=1
∫
f0(IT ) log
(
f0(pit)
fi(pit)
)
dIT
=
T∑
t=1
(
1
2
log
(
1/2
1/2 + 
)
+
1
2
log
(
1/2
1/2− 
))
= −(T/2) log (1− 42) .
Then, by (B.5) and by setting  = T−1/2/2
√
5, we get
max
i∈{1,2}
RµT (fi) ≥
T
4
(
1−
√
−T log (1− 42)
)
=
√
T
8
√
5
(
1−
√
−T log (1− 1/(5T ))
)
≥
√
T
16
√
5
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where the last inequality follows from the fact that − log(1 − x) ≤ (5/4)x for
0 ≤ x ≤ 1/5.
Observe that the magnitude of the derivative of r(0)(x) is equal to |p¯i−x|/ for
(1− )/2 ≤ x ≤ (1 + )/2 and 0 otherwise. So, for distributions f1 and f2, r(0)(x)
is Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant L = 3/2 because |p¯i− x|/ ≤ 3/2
for (1 − )/2 ≤ x ≤ (1 + )/2. Hence, assumptions (A1), (A2), and (A3) are
satisfied for both distributions.
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